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IT'S NOT LOVE, BUT IT'S NOT BAD: A RESPONSE TO
CRITICS OF PREPAID COLLEGE TUITION PLANS
J. Timothy Philipps*
Ed R. Haden**
I. INTRODUCTION
Two years ago one of the authors published an article surveying
the tax ramifications of prepaid college tuition plans, with a focus
on the Michigan plan - the Michigan Education Trust ("MET").1
That article took a generally positive view of such plans in general
and of MET in particular. It discussed three basic themes: 1) the
uncertainty of existing tax law with respect to prepaid tuition
plans requires clarifying congressional legislation; 2) the position of
the Internal Revenue Service ("Service") with respect to prepaid
tuition plans, as enunciated in a private letter ruling addressed to
MET,2 is flawed; and 3) the position that prepaid tuition plans are
basically a good idea, that deserve tax-favored treatment in any
clarifying congressional legislation in order to be successful.3 Com-
mentary by other authors undoubtedly bears out the first theme.4
The novelty of prepaid tuition plans and their sheer lack of fit with
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University; B.S. 1962, Wheeling Jesuit College;
J.D. 1965, Georgetown University; LL.M. 1966, Harvard University.
** Research Assistant, Frances Lewis Law Center; C.P.A.; B.S. 1985, M.T.A. 1986, Uni-
versity of Alabama; J.D. Candidate, Washington and Lee University. The authors thank the
Frances Law Center for their support of this article.
1. J. Timothy Philipps, Federal Taxation of Prepaid College Tuition Plans, 47 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 291 (1990).
2. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (May 5, 1988), reprinted in 11 Fed Taxes (P-H) T54,969 (May
5, 1988) [hereinafter Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027, with Prentice-Hall page number). A second
ruling followed Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 in January 1989, essentially restating the position
of the prior ruling. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-01-027 (Jan. 6, 1989). This was apparently a response
to a request from the state of Indiana on its proposed tuition prepayment plan. At the time
of this writing there have been no subsequent letter rulings on state plans, although Florida
has requested a ruling for its plan. See Letter from Robert L. Maige to Assistant Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue (EPIEO) (Mar. 21, 1990) (on file with author). At this writing,
the Service has not issued a ruling in response to Florida's request. Telephone Interview
with William Nichols, Florida Prepaid Education Expense Board (Aug. 1, 1991).
3. See Philipps, supra note 1, passim.
4. See Alan Gunn, Economic and Tax Aspects of Prepaid Tuition Plans, 17 J.C. & U.L.
243 (1990); Jeffrey S. Lehman, Social Irresponsibility, Actuarial Assumptions, Wealth Re-
distribution: Lessons About Public Policy from a Prepaid Tuition Program, 88 MIH. L.
REv. 1035 (1990).
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existing Internal Revenue Code provisions make predicting the tax
consequences of such plans more an exercise in speculation than in
legal analysis. Perhaps one could do as well by casting lots or
throwing darts as with the Code and regulations. Moreover, the
commentators have generally agreed that the Service's position is
flawed, although for widely varying reasons. 5
Some commentators, however, have taken a much dimmer view
of prepaid tuition plans, particularly MET. The desirability of pre-
payment plans and their claim to tax-favored treatment are dis-
puted.6 This article responds to the critics of prepaid tuition plans.
Although many of the criticisms of existing plans are well taken,
the authors believe that the prepaid tuition concept meets a genu-
ine need for a middle class college savings vehicle. Plans enacted
subsequent to MET, such as the Alabama and Florida plans," have
made improvements from both the technical tax law standpoint
and the broader social policy standpoint.
Despite the criticisms, policymakers should not abandon the
prepaid college tuition concept as an unworkable pipe dream, or a
cynical ploy to garner middle class votes. Rather, the idea is an
evolving one that demands further consideration to iron out the
flaws that have appeared in its early implementation. Current
plans do have flaws. But those flaws may be remediable, and even
if all the flaws cannot be remedied, the virtues of tuition prepay-
ment plans outweigh their vices. Prepayment plans may not be a
panacea but they are worthwhile. In the words of an old country
music tune, "It's not love, but it's not bad."8
This article 1) reviews problems of the MET plan raised by
other commentators, 2) suggests some possible resolutions for
these problems, 3) argues for tax-favored treatment of prepaid tui-
tion plans, and 4) offers an illustrative plan that could be used by
the private sector as well as by state-sponsored prepaid tuition
plans.
5. Compare Gunn, supra note 4, at 254-59 with David Williams II, Financing a College
Education: A Taxing Dilemma, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 561, 589 (1989).
6. See Gunn, supra note 4, passim; Lehman, supra note 4, at 1107-1133. Another article
took a more favorable view of prepaid tuition plans. See Williams, supra note 5, at 561. The
new administration in Michigan is reportedly rethinking its commitment to MET in the
wake of criticisms of the program. See Goldie Blumenstyk, 2 States Rethink Prepaid-Tui-
tion Plans; Elsewhere the Programs Run Smoothly, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 27, 1991, at
A22.
7. See ALA. CODE §§ 16-33C-1 to 16-33C-7 (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.551 (1990).
8. A real-life country song title whose author and publisher have thus far eluded us.
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II. CRITICISMS OF PREPAID TUITION PLANS
Commentators have leveled several criticisms at prepaid tuition
plans, particularly the MET plan. These criticisms are directed at
both the technical tax law aspects of prepaid tuition plans and at
their policy aspects.
A. Tax Law Criticisms
There are two technical tax law criticisms of prepaid tuition
plans. The first involves the exposure under section 7872 of the
Internal Revenue Code ("IRC")9 of the purchaser of a prepaid tui-
tion plan contract (usually a parent or grandparent) to being taxed
on account of accrual of the plan beneficiary's right to receive edu-
cational services. Section 7872 deals with the tax treatment of
loans with below-market interest rates. The second criticism con-
cerns the exposure of the prepaid tuition plan itself to being taxed
on its investment income.
1. Tax Exposure of Contract Purchaser
In a recent article, Professor Alan Gunn argues for the possible
applicability of IRC section 7872 to prepaid tuition plans.10 While
Professor Gunn's arguments are persuasive, we believe that there
are equally persuasive arguments against applicability of section
7872. A prior article sets these arguments out in detail." We ad-
dress here only Professor Gunn's specific criticisms.
a. Legislative History
Professor Gunn states that the legislative history of section 7872
does not mention prepaid tuition payments. 12 That is correct if one
limits the term "legislative history" to committee reports. How-
ever, if one includes congressional hearings as part of the legisla-
tive history, there is an indication that Congress did not intend
section 7872 to apply to prepaid tuition plans.
9. I.R.C. § 7872 (1988) (entitled, "Treatment of Loans with Below-Market Interest
Rates").
10. Gunn, supra note 4, at 251-53.
11. Philipps, supra note 1, at 303-08.
12. Gunn, supra note 4, at 251.
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In 1983 the Subcommittee on Internal Revenue Service Over-
sight of the Senate Finance Committee conducted hearings in
preparation for enacting the comprehensive time-value of money
provisions that were the heart of the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984.11 During these hearings the Treasury presented testimony
concerning various perceived abuses proposed to be remedied by
the Act. Included in that testimony was the following example:
Rather than charging parent tuition of $5,000 in 1985, College will
accept $4,000 in 1983. Because College can earn $1,000 on the $4,000
over the two years without incurring any income tax liability, it is
indifferent between $4,000 today and $5,000 in 1985. Parent is not
indifferent, however. If he invested the $4,000 for two years, he
would owe tax on the $1,000 earned .... In effect, the arrangement
allows College to invest Parent's $4,000 and apply the tax-free earn-
ings to Parent's tuition obligation, without subjecting Parent to tax
on those earningg.14
Hence, the Treasury had specifically called prepaid tuition
transactions to Congress' attention prior to the enactment of the
comprehensive 1984 time-value of money legislation. Congress, in
enacting the time-value of money provisions of the Code, easily
could have enacted provisions dealing explicitly with prepaid tui-
tion programs. Congress was certainly aware of the idea. Congress
did not choose to enact such a provision. Congress did enact com-
prehensive and detailed legislation covering a myriad of tax plan-
ning devices. Despite the explicit reference to prepaid tuition ar-
rangements by the Treasury in the hearings, no specific provision
taxing prepaid tuition plans was contained in the comprehensive
and extremely detailed legislation that became the Deficit Reduc-
tion Act of 1984.15 The fact that the Treasury explicitly called pre-
paid tuition transactions to Congress' attention and that Congress
failed to enact any specific provision to govern these transactions
indicates that Congress intended the existing law to continue to
govern.
13. See I.R.C. §§ 461, 467, 483, 1271-78, 7872, enacted or amended by Tax Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98th. Cong., 2d Sess., 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
14. Abusive Tax Shelters: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service of the Senate Finance Committee, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1983)
(statement of Robert G. Woodward, Acting Tax Legislative Counsel, United States Treasury
Department).
15. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
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Prior to the 1984 Act, interest-free and below-market interest
loans were held not to result in taxable income to the borrower or
the lender. 6 The detailed provisions of the 1984 Act changed this
result in certain cases. For transactions to which the detailed pro-
visions of the 1984 Act do not apply explicitly, the inference is that
the 1984 Act provisions are not applicable. Hence, the case law re-
sult of non-taxability should continue to apply.
b. Tax Avoidance Loans
Section 7872 lists several categories of loans to which it applies:
1) gift loans (for example, loans from a parent to a child); 2) em-
ployment related loans (for example, loans from an employer to an
employee); 3) corporation-shareholder loans (for example, loans
from a corporation to a shareholder); 4) loans of which one of the
principal purposes is the avoidance of any federal tax; and 5) to
the extent provided in regulations, any below-market loan not in-
cluded in one of the first four categories to the extent that the
interest arrangements have a significant effect on the federal tax
liability of the lender or borrower. 17 Professor Gunn emphasizes
the possibility that prepaid tuition plans could be characterized as
category four tax avoidance loans."' It is also conceivable that pre-
paid tuition loans could come within category five.
Section 7872 applies to "[a]ny below-market loan 1 of the princi-
pal purposes of the interest arrangements of which is the avoid-
ance of any federal tax.'"-" We agree that prepaid tuition plans
could conceivably come within the tax avoidance loan category.
Application of this provision raises a "purpose" issue which is gen-
erally treated as a question of fact, and, hence, involves a high de-
gree of uncertainty. 0 Nevertheless, we believe that there are strong
16. See, e.g. Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931 (1979), aff'd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir.
1982); Suttle v. Commissioner, 1978-393 T.C.M. (CCH), aff'd, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980);
Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 317 (1979); Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961); P.
Kieth Bilter, Interest-Free Loans - Boon or Bust, 37 MAJOR TAX PLANNING 23-1 (1985);
Michael D. Hartigan, From Dean and Crown to the Tax Reform Act of 1984: Taxation of
Interest-Free Loans, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31 (1984); Daniel E. Riley, Note, Recent De-
velopments Affecting the Income and Gift Tax Consequences of Interest-Free Loans, 40
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1685 (1983).
17. I.R.C. §§ 7872(c)(1)(A),(B),(C),(D),(E) (1988). A sixth category, irrelevant to this dis-
cussion, includes certain loans to continuing care facilities. Id. § 7872(c)(1)(F).
18. Gunn, supra note 4, at 251-53.
19. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(D) (1988).
20. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); 1 BORIS I. BITTER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATON OF INCOME, GwVrs AND ESTATES 5 4.3 (2d ed. 1989); Walter J.
1992] 285
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arguments that prepaid tuition plans should not come within this
provision.
This "purpose" test looks to the purpose for structuring the
transaction as it is constituted rather than structuring it in some
other way.21 Whether it is the state's or the plan purchaser's pur-
pose that the test looks to is not entirely clear. Since the state has
control over the structure of the plan, it is reasonable to look to
the state's purposes.
The statute requires that the tax avoidance be a principal pur-
pose. There can be more than one principal purpose. The diction-
ary definition of principal is, "[b]elonging to the first or highest
group in rank or importance; of the first order; main, prominent,
leading. '22 While dictionary definitions are obviously not control-
ling, they can afford guidance. The basic idea is that a principal
purpose is a main purpose. Not every purpose is a main purpose. A
purpose can be incidental or subsidiary to a main or principal pur-
pose. For example, the principal purposes of a lawyer arguing a
case may be to win for the client and earn a fee. An incidental
purpose may be to attract other clients with the lawyer's good
work.
There is no doubt that the purpose of minimizing taxes played a
part in the creation of tuition prepayment plans. 23 The question is
whether that was a main purpose or simply an incidental purpose.
In other words, the issue is whether the tax savings result was the
Blum, How the Courts, Congress and the IRS Try to Limit Legal Tax Avoidance, 10 J.
TAX'N 300 (1959); Ned Fischer, Intent and Taxes, 32 TAXES 303 (1954).
21. The proposed regulations under § 7872 state that:
For purposes of this rule, tax avoidance is a principal purpose of the interest arrange-
ments if a principal factor in the decision to structure the transaction as a below-
market loan (rather than, for example, as a market interest rate loan and a payment
by the lender to the borrower) is to reduce the federal tax liability of the borrower or
the lender or both. The purpose for entering the transaction (for example, to make a
gift or to pay compensation).is irrelevant in determining whether a principal purpose
of the interest arrangements of the loan is the avoidance of federal tax.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(e)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. 161 (1985).
22. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1373 (2d ed. 1978). This is a secondary definition. The
Oxford English Dictionary gives the first definition of "principal" as "First or highest in
rank or importance ... " Id. This would preclude there being more than one principal pur-
pose. However, the wording of the statute ("1 of the principal purposes") makes clear that
Congress contemplated that there could be more than one principal purpose. Consequently,
the secondary definitions appear more appropriate in this context.
23. For example, the MET legislation was conditional on a favorable IRS ruling with re-
spect to income tax consequences to the purchaser of the plan (usually a parent or grand-
parent). See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 390.1433.3 (1990).
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impetus for structuring the prepaid tuition arrangement as it was
structured, as opposed to some other reason. In addressing this is-
sue, one could compare MET's structure with an arrangement
under which a university accepts advance payments for tuition. Al-
ternatively, one could compare MET with the option of the state's
issuing tax-exempt bonds. The comparison with issuance of tax-
exempt bonds is more apt, inasmuch as the state of Michigan, not
the colleges and universities, established MET to sell prepaid tui-
tion contracts. Since the state easily could have issued tax-exempt
bonds that would certainly exonerate the parent of any tax liability
for interest income, no tax was avoided by the state's establish-
ment of MET to perform a similar function.24
The Michigan Legislature stated its purposes in creating MET
as promoting state institutions of higher education and advancing
the education of the state's citizenry.2 5 Perhaps the cynic can dis-
miss a state legislature's statement of purpose, but that does, in
effect, presume that the state legislature is promulgating lies on its
own statute books.
Given all the tax uncertainties involved in prepaid tuition plans,
it is difficult to believe that rational persons would devise such
plans with a main purpose to avoid federal taxes on interest in-
come. If avoidance of tax on interest income were more than a sub-
sidiary purpose, the state could easily achieve that purpose by is-
suing tax-exempt bonds to parents for the purpose of college
saving. In fact, several states have done precisely that by issuing
so-called baccalaureate bonds the interest on which is tax-free to
the purchasers.26
24. Even if the proper comparison is to a university prepayment arrangement, there is an
argument that the state has accomplished no tax avoidance for the parent by structuring
MET as it is. The Service held in 1988 that MET is taxable on its earnings. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
88-25-027, supra note 2, 54,987. Those earnings will be used to pay the tuition of the
contract beneficiaries. This imposes a quasi-withholding tax on earnings that are earmarked
for tuition payments. To use Professor Gunn's own words, "[T]he parents will in fact pay
the MET's taxes, even though they are not, nominally, liable." Gunn, supra note 4 at 258.
Professor Gunn also states, "One does not enhance one's after-tax welfare by paying some-
one else's 34% tax instead of paying one's own 28% tax." Id. This amounts to construing
I.R.C. § 7872 to find tax avoidance on a transaction, while simultaneously asserting that the
very same transaction does not avoid tax.
25. MICH. Comp. LAWS § 390.1423.
26. As of September 1990, 28 states had adopted tax-exempt baccalaureate bond plans:
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Aims C. McGuINNESS & CHRISTINE PAULSON, ED-
1992] 287
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The states that created prepaid tuition plans obviously have
contemplated much more than tax exemption. They want to estab-
lish plans that will provide an accessible college savings plan with
protection against tuition inflation. The fact that Michigan chose
to go ahead with MET in spite of an adverse Private Letter Ruling
speaks for itself on the purpose issue. If tax avoidance was more
than an incidental purpose, Michigan would have abandoned or
materially altered its plan. Officials of the MET plan went ahead,
because, as stated by a MET spokesman, "[t]he key is the tuition
guarantee. Forget the tax implications. 27
Is avoidance of tax on interest income a main purpose of setting
up MET and other tuition prepayment plans the way they are
structured? Or is tax avoidance an incidental, albeit hoped-for,
goal? The applicable proposed Treasury regulation does not negate
the distinction between a main and an incidental purpose.28 A
state could choose to help middle class taxpayers provide college
education for their children in a variety of ways: by educational
grants, issuance of baccalaureate bonds, or by a prepaid tuition
plan. The first two alternatives would most certainly be tax free.
Most state aid to education is tax exempt. A state interested
mainly in the tax results probably would not choose the alternative
with the greatest tax risk.
A reading of the regulation that rejects a distinction between
main and incidental purposes would mean that any arrangement
that avoids some taxes would automatically come within section
7872. The tax-saving result would automatically imply the requi-
site purpose. Any tax-saving purpose, however remote or indirect,
would be sufficient to bring section 7872 into play. We question
whether Congress intended such a broad sweep for section 7872.
Another hurdle to the application of section 7872 is the classifi-
cation of the prepaid tuition transaction as a loan. Professor Gunn
argues that Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. 29 in-
UCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES 1990 SURVEY OF COLLEGE SAVINGS AND GUARANTEED TuI-
TION PROGRAMS Section I, at 4-5. Of these, all but Arkansas, Colorado, Ohio, and West Vir-
ginia had at least one baccalaureate bond sale by the end of 1990. Id.
27. Statement of Michigan Treasury spokesman Robert Kolt, quoted in Ellin Rosenthal,
Tax Implications of Michigan Tuition Prepayment Program Remain Unsettled, 39 TAx
NOTES 676, 678 (1988). At another point Michigan Treasury Secretary Robert A. Bowman
stated that the program should not be scrapped because of tax issues. Lehman, supra note
4, at 1129 n.278.
28. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(e)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. 161 (1985).
29. 493 U.S. 203 (1990).
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dicates that prepaid tuition plans may be classified as loans.3 0 In-
dianapolis Power distinguishes between a loan and a prepayment
on the basis of whether the payment, "protects [the seller] against
the risk that the purchaser will back out of the deal before the
seller performs."' If the payment so protects the seller then it is a
prepayment, not a loan. A payment with a commitment to
purchase would be a prepayment, while a payment with no such
commitment would be a loan. 2
The argument is that prepaid tuition contracts are loans, not
prepayments, because the purchaser gets a refund if the child does
not go to college. There is, therefore, no commitment to go through
with the deal. Aside from the fact that the Indianapolis Power sit-
uation differs from that of tuition prepayment plans, there is a
strong practical incentive (if not a strictly legal commitment) to
use the educational services rather than seek a refund. This is true
because the refund allowed is likely to be worth much less than the
educational services available.3 3 Nevertheless, Indianapolis Power
indicates that it is the legal rights of the parties, not the practical
ramifications of the transaction that control loan classification.3 4
Moreover, the definition of a loan in the proposed regulations is
quite broad. 5 Therefore, Indianapolis Power, in conjunction with
the proposed regulation, may well cause the prepaid tuition trans-
action to be classified as a loan.
However, classification of the prepaid tuition contract as a loan
arrangement is by no means a certainty. The proposed regulations
do provide an exception to loan classification for certain prepay-
ment transactions. Prepayment for services is not classified as a
loan if made in a manner consistent with normal commercial prac-
tices. Again, whether prepaid tuition programs conform to normal
30. Gunn, supra note 4, at 252.
31. Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203, 212
(1990)).
32. Id.
33. See Lehman, supra note 4, at 1066-69. Professor Gunn recognizes this in his article.
Gunn, supra note 4, at 252 n.19.
34. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. at 213-14.
35. The term "loan" is to be interpreted broadly to implement the anti-abuse intent of
the statute. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2(a)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553 (1985). The proposed
regulation defines loan as "any extension of credit and any transaction under which the
owner of money permits another person to use the money for a period of time after which
the money is to be transferred to the owner or applied according to an express or implied
agreement with the owner." Id. However, a bona fide prepayment made in a manner consis-
tent with normal commercial practices for services is generally not a loan.
1992]
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commercial practices appears to be a factual question. These pro-
grams are new and innovative. To that extent they do not conform
to normal commercial practices. By the same token, they are mar-
keted in a commercial context and advertised as prepayments for
future services, and not advertised as loans.3 6
Finally, a practical argument for not applying section 7872 to
prepaid tuition plans is a sheer lack of fit between these plans and
the section itself. Assume the section is applicable to prepaid tui-
tion plans. How would it apply? The proposed regulations cannot
readily apply to prepaid tuition plans because of the uncertain in-
terest rate and total payouts associated with them. Furthermore,
under the regulations is a prepaid tuition plan a demand loan or a
term loan?38 While these problems are certainly not insurmounta-
ble, they do indicate that the drafters of the section did not have
prepaid tuition plans in mind when they wrote the section.
In summary, we do not quarrel with the plausibility of Professor
Gunn's arguments. We do believe, nevertheless, that the accumula-
tion of counter-arguments presents a persuasive case for not apply-
ing section 7872 to prepaid tuition plans. The Internal Revenue
Service has not attempted to apply section 7872 in the letter rul-
ings it has issued so far. We do not believe this is because the writ-
36. Professor Lehman argues that a MET contract is a hybrid equity-insurance product.
However, he acknowledges the possibility that the IRS could classify the contract as a varia-
ble rate loan. Lehman, supra note 4, at 1098.
37. In determining whether an obligation is a below market loan, the interest rate of a
variable rate loan will be the rate fixed by the index (e.g., LIBOR, AFR, or Treasury Bill
rate) on the date the loan is made. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(e)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553
(1985). A prepaid tuition contract's interest rate will be determined by the cost of tuition
upon maturity and the earnings of the tuition fund, rather than a general market index.
Further, in determining the amount of original issue discount to impute on certain below-
market loans, the present value of "all payments which are required to be made under the
terms of the loan" must be determined. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-7(a)(1)(B), 50 Fed. Reg.
33558 (1985). A prepaid tuition contract "requires" tuition to be paid, and the amount of
tuition cannot be determined with the accuracy of principal and interest payments due on
an average loan.
38. Section 7872 defines a demand loan as "any loan which is payable in full at any time
on demand of the lender." I.R.C. § 7872(f)(5) (1988). A prepaid tuition contract is not paya-
ble upon demand of the purchaser or beneficiary, but rather upon matriculation, death, or
some other event. Thus, it appears that a prepaid tuition contract would not be a demand
loan. Section 7872 defines a term loan as "any loan which is not a demand loan." I.R.C. §
7872(f)(6) (1988). Also, any loan that is outstanding for an ascertainable time is a term loan.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-10(a)(2), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553 (1985). Since a prepaid tuition con-
tract beneficiary may not matriculate directly upon high school graduation, but within some
limited time thereafter, the term of the prepaid tuition contract is not definitely ascertaina-
ble. However, given the broad Internal Revenue Code definition, a prepaid tuition contract
seems to be closer to a term loan than a demand loan.
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ers of these rulings had not kept up to date past Eisner v. Ma-
comber,39 as Professor Gunn facetiously suggests.4 ° Prepaid tuition
plans might logically be dealt with under any number of theories
applying existing law, many of which are inconsistent with one an-
other.41 It is precisely for this reason that we believe Congress
should enact legislation governing the tax consequences of prepaid
tuition plans. The tax consequences of such a significant and inno-
vative approach to college finance should not be left to logic chop-
ping and argument by analogy.
c. Applicability of Section 103
To the extent that a prepaid tuition contract constitutes a
"loan," the commentators have indicated that the interest from
such a loan potentially could be tax-exempt under section 103.42
Section 103 provides, in general, that "gross income does not in-
clude interest on any State or local bond."4 3 Professor Gunn accu-
rately points out that an obligation must be issued by a state or
political subdivision pursuant to its borrowing power in order to
gain tax-exempt treatment under section 103.44 In addition to the
borrowing power requirement, a prepaid tuition contract must also
avoid classification as an arbitrage bond under section 148 in order
provide its holder with tax-free interest income.45
(i) Borrowing Power
Professor Gunn states that "[b]ecause money paid under the
Michigan plan is kept separate from other state funds, an argu-
ment that the state has not exercised its 'borrowing power' has
some plausibility."'46 However, the exercise of borrowing power is
not evidenced by the intermingling of the bond retirement funds
39. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
40. Gunn, supra note 4, at 259.
41. See Philipps, supra note 1, at 302-33; Gunn, supra note 4, at 251-59; Lehman, supra
note 4, at 1081-99.
42. See Philipps, supra note 1, at 308-09; Gunn, supra note 4, at 253.
43. I.R.C. § 103(a) (1988). Section 103 then defines a "State or local bond" as "any obliga-
tion of a state or political subdivision thereof." Id. § 103(c)(1). The courts have long ruled
that such an obligation does not have to be evidenced by a formal bond. Commissioner v.
Meyer, 104 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1939). Thus, a prepaid tuition contract could fall into the
broad definition of obligation under § 103.
44. See Gunn, supra note 4, at 253.
45. I.R.C. § 103(b)(2) (1988).
46. See Gunn, supra note 4, at 253.
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with state funds. Rather, exercise of the borrowing power requires
1) a binding obligation of the state to repay, and 2) a voluntary
transaction generating the repayment obligation.
Several cases illustrate the binding obligation requirement for
exercise of the borrowing power. These cases hold that the issuance
of bonds secured only by special assessments, rather than the gen-
eral funds, is an exercise of the borrowing power of a state or polit-
ical subdivision.47 Professor Gunn cites King v. Commissioner8 in
support of the proposition that the separation of MET funds from
other state funds could give rise to an argument that the bargain-
ing power has not been exercised.4e While the Service raised this
argument in King, the opinion indicates that the Tax Court be-
lieved that the separation of funds was not a relevant factor.50
Thus, as long as MET is legally obligated to repay the principal
and any earnings thereon to the beneficiary or the college the ben-
eficiary attends, the binding obligation prong of the borrowing
47. In Commissioner v. Pontarelli, 97 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1938), the court stated in refer-
ence to special assessment sewer bonds:
Although such obligations do not constitute a debt payable from the general funds,
yet bonds which are issued in the name of the municipality to be paid only from a
special fund created by an enabling act and so limited on the face of the obligation
are the bonds of the municipality ... The municipality as the obligor [of] the bond,
must fulfill the obligations imposed upon it and is subject to appropriate action in
respect thereof, notwithstanding the fact that it is not under any general liability...
for the debt.
Id. at 795 (quoting 2 JOHN FORREST DILLON, DILLON ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 827, at
1388 (5th ed. 1911)).
In Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Harrison, 63 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. 11. 1945), revenue bonds
issued by several municipalities and to be repaid from the funds generated by the water and
power machinery purchased with the proceeds thereof were tax-exempt. The court held that
the revenue funds were as much the property of the municipalities as their general tax
funds. Thus, the transactions involved the borrowing power of the municipalities. Further,
in Commissioner v. Estate of Shamberg, 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944), the court stated, "[i]t
has many times been held that bonds issued by municipalities are within the exemption...
even though payment is to be made only out of special funds and the credit of the munici-
palities was not pledged." Id. at 1006.
48. 77 T.C. 1113 (1981).
49. See Gunn, supra note 4, at 253 n.26.
50. The Tax Court in King stated:
Although we think that [the political subdivision] remained liable to [the seller] for
payment of the warrants regardless of what happened to the [separate retirement]
account, we note that the bonds issued by municipalities have been held within sec.
103(a)(1) or its predecessors even though payment was to be made out of special
funds and the general credit of the municipalities was not pledged.
King, 77 T.C. at 1123 n.7.
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power test could be satisfied even though the MET funds were
kept separate from other Michigan state funds.5
The voluntary transaction requirement reflects the purpose be-
hind the congressional policy52 of not taxing the interest on state
and local obligations: to aid state and local governments in raising
debt-financed capital to be used in the furtherance of the public
interest.53 State bonds, if tax-exempt, will command a better price
in the market than if they are subject to taxation "because the
purchaser is not compelled to buy them and, being a free agent,
may be induced by the tax-exemption feature to prefer them to
private bonds for investment. ' 54 When a state issues a tax-exempt
bond, a voluntary investor will be attracted to the bond by its tax
exemption.
By contrast, where a state condemns property, the owner is
forced to sell the property to the government for just compensa-
tion. Accordingly, whether the state's payment to the owner is tax-
exempt or not will not influence the owner's decision to enter 'the
transaction. Hence, if the state pays for the condemned property
with an interest bearing note instead of cash, the interest will not
fall within the scope of section 103's exemption.5 Professor Gunn
calls the distinction between applying the section 103 exemption to
51. There is an argument that MET is, in fact, an integral part of the state, and that
MET funds are state funds. See Philipps, supra note 1, at 321-25. However, an issue that
still would have to be decided is whether MET is actually bound to repay "principal and
interest." If MET were not so obligated, the binding obligation requirement would not be
met. Michigan law authorizes MET to issue contracts that provide for payment to the speci-
fied college or university of all of the funds allocable to the beneficiary up to the amount of
tuition. MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 390.1426 (1987). The funds allocable to a beneficiary could be
divided into the initial purchase price (i.e., principal) and the earnings thereon (i.e., inter-
est). However, if MET's investment experience is very poor and the funds on hand no longer
exceed the initial purchase price of the contract, MET is only liable for the amount of funds
on hand. Thus, MET is not liable for a fixed amount of principal or interest. This may not
satisfy the requirement.
52. The Supreme Court has held that the federal government is not constitutionally pro-
hibited from taxing the interest on state and local obligations. South Carolina v. Baker, 485
U.S. 505 (1988). Congress has continued to refrain from taxing the interest on state and
local obligations, however, as a matter of policy.
53. Holley v. United States, 124 F.2d 909, 911 (6th Cir. 1942).
54. King, 77 T.C. at 1119 (quoting United States Trust Co. v. Anderson, 65 F.2d 575, 578
(2d Cir. 1933)).
55. See id. ("It disregards the whole purpose of the exemption to apply it to interest upon
obligations of a state which it can compel a citizen to take in exchange for the fair value of
his property."). In condemnation proceedings, a state or municipality is deemed to be exer-
cising its power of eminent domain rather than its borrowing power. Holley v. United
States, 124 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1942); Williams Land Co. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 499
(1940).
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voluntary and involuntary obligations "absurdly formal."56 Never-
theless, we agree with the federal judiciary57 that it would be in-
consistent with the purpose of assisting states to raise debt-fi-
nanced capital to apply the exemption also to transactions where
the creditor would enter into the transaction even without the ex-
emption feature.
Since the purchase of a prepaid tuition contract is completely
voluntary on the part of the purchaser, the exemption of any inter-
est income attributable to the holder of the contract would no
doubt serve as a market inducement for the purchase of the con-
tract. Accordingly, if MET is deemed to be part of a state or politi-
cal subdivision,58 the sales of prepaid tuition contracts could be
viewed as an exercise of the state's borrowing power.
(ii) Arbitrage
Once the borrowing power requirement has been satisfied, an ob-
ligation must avoid classification as an arbitrage bond in order to
obtain tax-exempt status 5 9 Section 148 defines an arbitrage bond
as "any bond.., any portion of the proceeds of which are reasona-
bly expected [at the time of issuance of the bond] to be used di-
rectly or indirectly to acquire higher yielding investments ...."60
"Higher yielding investments" are defined as "any investment
property which produces a yield over the term of the issue which is
materially higher than the yield on issue."'" Thus, if the actual re-
turn on investment exceeds the "yield. on issue", the obligation will
be classified as an arbitrage bond.2
56. See Gunn, supra note 4, at 253 n.26 ("The Tax Court held in King that interest on
negotiable notes given as part of the purchase price of property bought (but not con-
demned) by the agency was exempt. The distinction drawn in these and other cases strikes
me as absurdly formal, but it does exist.").
57. See supra notes 54 & 55.
58. I.R.C. § 103(c)(1) (1988) requires a state or political subdivision thereof to issue an
obligation in order for the interest to be tax-exempt. An IRS ruling stated that because
MET was a separate entity from the state, was not subject to state control, and was pro-
tected from state use of its funds, etc., it was neither a part of the state government nor a
political subdivision thereof. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027, supra note 2. Hence, a key issue is
whether a state sponsored prepaid tuition plan is a "state or political subdivision thereof"
instead of whether the borrowing power is exercised by the sale of the prepaid tuition con-
tracts. For a discussion of this issue, see Philipps, supra note 1, at 321-27.
59. I.R.C. § 103(b)(2) (1988).
60. Id. § 148(a)(1).
61. Id. § 148(b)(1).
62. In general, an investment yield which exceeds the yield on issue by more than .125%
will be deemed "materially higher" than the yield on issue. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(5)
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While the actual return on the investments is self-explanatory,
the yield on issue is substantially more difficult to determine. Pro-
fessor Gunn assumes that the yield on issue is the "zero explicit
interest paid by [the prepaid tuition plan]."63 However, the yield
on the bond issue is defined as the discount rate that will equate
the present value of all future unconditional payments of principal
and interest with the issue price of the obligation.6 4 The issue price
of a prepaid tuition contract will generally be its purchase price.
6 5
Thus, the yield on issue is the discount rate necessary to equate
the present value of the total payments a beneficiary receives on a
prepaid tuition contract (i.e., the cost of four years of college tui-
tion starting on the date of matriculation) with the original
purchase price his parents paid for the contract. 6
The regulations pose difficulties in their application to the pre-
paid tuition contract obligation. The regulations calculate yield
based on the unconditional principal and interest payments due
under the bond provisions .67 For a prepaid tuition contract, the ul-
timate amount of tuition payable (which will be comprised of a
return of the original investment and investment earnings) is de-
pendent on tuition levels and investment earnings that can only be
(1979). In certain instances, however, the de minimis percentage is increased to 1.5%. Id. §
1.103-13(b)(5)(vii). Thus, if the actual return on investment exceeds the "yield on issue" by
the applicable de minimis percentage, the obligation will be classified as an arbitrage bond
under I.R.C. § 148.
63. Gunn, supra note 4, at 254.
64. See Treas. Reg. § 1.148-3T(b)(5)(i) (1989).
65. I.R.C. § 148(h) provides that for purposes of determining the yield on issue, the issue
price of a bond will be determined under §§ 1273 and 1274. Section 1273(b)(1) provides that
for debt instruments which are publicly offered and not issued for property, the issue price
is the initial offering price to the public. Prepaid tuition contracts are issued to the public
and are issued in exchange for money, not property. Section 1273(b)(5) defines property as
including services and the right to use property, but not money. While prepaid tuition con-
tracts may be redeemed by the provision of educational services, they are issued in exchange
for a cash payment by the purchaser. Section 1273 focuses on the issuance exchange rather
than the redemption exchange. Hence, the issue price is the cash price of the contract.
66. For example, assume Mr. Smith purchases a prepaid tuition contract for his son for
$10,000 when the son is thirteen years old. The son matriculates at State University five
years later, and eventually graduates after four years of study. The total cost of four years of
tuition was $15,000 (i.e., 2,000, 3,000, 4,000 and 6,000). Accordingly, the yield of the prepaid
tuition contract is approximately 6.05% (rate necessary to produce the total payments on
the contract). If the tuition plan invested the initial contract price in a taxable mutual fund
that yielded 8.5% over the term of the contract, the contract will be classified as an arbi-
trage bond under I.R.C. § 148 (8.5% - 6.05% = 2.45% which exceeds the de minimis
percentage).
67. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.148-3T(b)(5)(i) (1989).
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predicted, not unconditionally guaranteed. 8 Accordingly, the ap-
plication of these regulations to a prepaid tuition contract epito-
mizes the attempt to fit a square contract into a round regulation.
The concept of arbitrage measurement and classification could
possibly apply to prepaid tuition contracts. If the yield on invest-
ment that a prepaid tuition plan earns over the term of a contract
exceeds the implicit discount rate on that contract by a material
amount,6 9 arbitrage classification could deny tax-exempt status.
However, the current regulations promulgated under section 148
do not explicitly provide for the type of debt obligation presented
by a prepaid tuition contract. This may be one of the reasons the
IRS avoided the issue by not imputing any interest income to the
contract holder over the term of the contract. 0
2. Tax Exposure of the Plan
The IRS took the position in a private letter ruling that MET is
taxable on its investment income. 1 Commentators have pointed
out that taxability of the investment income of a prepaid tuition
plan could have a disastrous effect on its financial soundness. 2 If a
plan is taxable on its investment income, its net rate of return on
investment would be diminished as compared to a tax-exempt situ-
ation. The plan either would have to increase its rate of return by
making riskier investments or increase the price charged for its
prepaid tuition contracts.
If a plan is already trying to maximize its rate of return, it will
probably be unable to increase its investment return by any sizea-
ble amount. Hence, the only alternative would be to increase the
price of the plan's prepaid tuition contracts. It is not certain just
68. Further, even for variable yield bonds, the amount of arbitrage is calculated via a five-
year recapture window vehicle. Id. §§ 1.148-3T(b)(2)(i), 1.148-8T(b)(1)(i) (1989). This meth-
odology looks at the previous five years a bond" was outstanding, computes the yield on
issue, and compares this to the investment yield to determine the amount of arbitrage. Id. §
1.148-2T. This process is repeated until the bond is retired. The amount of arbitrage can be
paid over to the IRS at the end of each five-year period in order to prevent the loss of tax-
exempt status of the bonds. I.R.C. § 148(f) (1988). The five-year look-back period is suffi-
cient for a regular bond issue because the municipality will be redeeming investments and
spending the proceeds for governmental purposes each year. Prepaid tuition plans may not
have to redeem investments and pay college tuition for periods of well over five years.
Again, the regulations were not designed to apply to prepaid tuition contracts.
69. See supra note 62.
70. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027, supra note 2, at (P-H) 1 54,987.
71. Id.
72. Lehman, supra note 4, at 1127-32; Gunn, supra note 4, at 256-58.
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how much higher the price of a contract would have to be if the
plan chose that course of action, but the increase would probably
be substantial.3 The higher priced contracts would be less attrac-
tive and less affordable. Consequently, a prepaid tuition plan with
taxable investment income faces a major problem that threatens
the viability of the whole plan. This threat appears to have de-
terred some states from going ahead with prepaid tuition plans. 74
A state may be able to avoid taxability of its prepaid tuition
plan if the plan is properly structured. The Service held that MET
is taxable because 1) it is not an integral part of state government,
and 2) it is not exempt from tax under section 115 because it pri-
marily benefits private, as opposed to public, interests. 75
The Service held that MET is not an integral part of state gov-
ernment, because 1) decisions by MET's board of directors cannot
be overridden by any state agency, 2) MET's funds are not derived
from the state or any state agency, 3) MET's funds are not subject
to claims of the state's creditors and "are not considered state
money or common cash of the state," 4) the state may not loan,
transfer or use MET's funds for any purpose, and 5) MET's funds
may only be used for the provision of educational services or re-
funds authorized in the trust's enabling legislation.7 6 The Service
concluded that since MET is not an integral part of state govern-
ment, it cannot be exempt from taxation on that ground. 7
The IRS has long taken the position that an integral part of
state government is not subject to income tax. For example, in
Revenue Rulings 71-131 and 71-132, the Service held that profits
from state-owned liquor stores are not subject to the income tax,
73. See Lehman, supra note 4, at 1065-1108.
74. Several states held up implementation of prepaid tuition plans following issuance of
Private Letter Ruling 88-25-027, presumably because the Service ruled that MET was a
taxable entity. See Elin Rosenthal, Tax Implications of Michigan Tuition Prepayment Pro-
gram Remain Unsettled, 39 TAx NOTES 676, 678-79 (1988). As of September 1990, six states
had adopted tuition prepayment plans but had not put them into operation. Indiana,
Maine, Oklahoma, Missouri, and West Virginia still have the legislation on their statute
books. The sixth state, Tennessee, repealed its legislation altogether. See McGUINNESS &
PAULSON, supra note 26, Section I, at 2.
75. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027, supra note 2, af (P-H) 1 54,987. Both of these conclusions
are subject to dispute. For a discussion of arguments against the Service's conclusions, see
Philipps, supra note 1, at 321-27.
76. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027, supra note 2, at (P-H) 54,987.
77. Id.
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because the stores are operated as an integral part of the state.7 8
The IRS bases its position on the notion that a state or subdivision
of a state is not taxable in the absence of a specific statutory provi-
sion imposing tax. Since the income tax statute imposes a tax gen-
erally on individuals, estates, trusts, and corporations, but not on
states, it follows that states are not generally subject to income
tax.79 Except for imposition of tax on the unrelated business in-
come of state colleges and universities," neither Congress nor the
Service has ever attempted to tax the direct income of a state.8'
It appears that a state could easily get around the Service's rea-
soning in the MET situation by structuring its plan as an integral
part of state government. Thus, if the plan is established as a divi-
sion of a state department (such as the Treasury), is operated by
state officials and employees, is made part of the state's funds,
subject to general creditors, and is protected by the state obliga-
tion to make good any shortfalls in investment income, the plan
would seem to qualify as an integral part of state government.
Hence, its investment income would be exempt from federal in-
come tax.
78. See Rev. Rul. 71-131, 1971-1 C.B. 29; Rev. Rul. 71-132, 1971-1 C.B. 29. Rev. Rul. 71-
131 superseded and adopted the reasoning of Gen. Couns. Mem. 14,407, reprinted in XIV-1
C.B. 103 (1935), which likewise exempted state-run liquor stores from income tax.
79. See Rev. Rul. 87-2, 1987-1 C.B. 18 (holding that a Lawyer Trust Account fund created
and controlled by State Supreme Court not subject to income tax because an integral part
of state government). The Service position is based on the income tax statute itself, and not
on any constitutional limitation on the power of the federal government to tax the states
under the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity.
The precise constitutional limits on the power of the federal government to tax the state
remain unclear. See Philipps, supra note 1, at 322; Michael Wells and Walter Hellerstein,
The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 U. VA. L. REv. 1073,
1080-85 (1980); Stefan F. Tucker and Robert A. Rombro, State Immunity from Federal
Taxation: The Need for Reexamination, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 501, 503-512 (1975).
80. See I.R.C. § 511(a)(2)(B) (1988) (imposing an income tax on the unrelated business
income of state colleges and universities).
81. In General Counsel Memorandum 14,407 the Service stated:
Not only has the Bureau failed to tax the direct income of any state or municipality
but it has throughout this period of 22 years made no effort to obtain income returns
from states or municipalities, or to determine by any other means whether any State
or municipality has had income of this nature. This persistent non-enforcement of
the tax against States may be reasonably explained only as indicating a tacit con-
struction by the Bureau in accordance with the interpretation that has just been
suggested.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 14,407, reprinted in XIV-1 C.B. 103 (1935).
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The state of Florida has structured its plan along these lines . 2
The Prepaid Postsecondary Expense Board, which is administra-
tively a part of the Division of Benefits of the Department of In-
surance, administers Florida's plan.83 The Board consists of state
officials, university officials, and appointees of the Governor. 4 The
Board is subject to state administrative procedures and other laws
governing state agencies and the program's annual budget must be
approved by the state.8 5 The Expense Board, acting with approval
of the State Board of Administration, is responsible for investing
the program's funds, which can be transferred to a commercial in-
vestment manager.86 Perhaps, most importantly, the Prepaid Post-
secondary Education Trust Fund is maintained within the State
Treasury,87 and the program's Master Covenant provides that fu-
ture tuition payments are guaranteed by the state.8 s Florida offi-
cials are 'hopeful that this structure will avoid the taxability
problems of the MET plan and have requested a letter ruling that
Florida's prepaid tuition plan is an integral part of the state whose
income is exempt from federal income tax.89
B. Policy Criticisms
Many of the policy criticisms made by commentators point out
real weaknesses in existing plans. For example, Professor Lehman
criticizes MET's actuarial assumptions as too optimistic"0 and Pro-
82. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.551 (West 1989). Also, the state of Alabama's plan has been
structured as an integral part of state government. ALA. CODE § 16-33C-1 (1990).
83. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.551(5) (West 1989).
84. Id.
85. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.551 (West 1989) and FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. 4G-
1.001 to 1.010; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 216.181.
86. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 240.551(5)(e), (f) (West 1989).
87. Id. § 240.551(4).
88. The Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Program Master Covenant
provides:
[a]U legal and beneficial interests in the assets held by the trust fund are vested in
the State for its exclusive benefit and the exclusive benefit of the colleges and univer-
sities; therefore, payments are guaranteed to be made on the beneficiary's behalf to
the State college or university.
THE FLORIDA PREPAID POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION EXPENSE PROGRAM MASTER COVENANT
1989-1990, § 5.08. Also, the Florida legislature will appropriate the amount of funds neces-
sary to meet any shortfall the trust fund experiences in meeting its obligations. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 240.551(9) (West 1989).
89. See Letter from Robert L. Maige to Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
supra note 2. As of August 1, 1991, the Service has not responded to Florida's ruling re-
quest. Telephone interview with William Nichols, supra note 2.
90.' See Lehman, supra note 4, at 1106-08.
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fessor Gunn laments the lack of a true tuition guarantee in the
MET plan."' These are valid criticisms. Professor Lehman's analy-
sis of problems associated with MET's implementation is particu-
larly acute, as is Professor Gunn's critique of MET's failure to pro-
vide a true tuition guarantee. Nevertheless, the idea should not be
,discarded. Some of the commentators' general objections about
prepaid tuition plans appear to be basically ideological in nature.2
Such objections obviously are matters about which reasonable peo-
ple can differ; the subject may be approached from a different ide-
ological perspective. Many of the specific problems raised can be
remedied in subsequent programs. Moreover, it may be possible to
devise a tuition program that would involve not only state-spon-
sored institutions, but the private sector as well.
The arguments in favor of prepaid tuition plans have been dis-
cussed in a previous article.93 This article will discuss objections
that have been raised to prepaid tuition plans, restating the argu-
• ments in favor of prepaid tuition plans where necessary, while at-
tempting to avoid unnecessary repetition of the prior article.
1. Actual Legal Tuition Insurance Not Provided
Professor Gunn aptly points out that MET does not provide an
actual tuition guarantee. 4 In order to provide actual insurance
protection against future increases in the cost of college tuition, a
prepaid tuition plan sponsored by the state would need financial
backing other than the plan's own funds which could pay any
shortfall between funds on hand and the actual cost of tuition. One
way to obtain this financial backing is to have the state guarantee
that it will make up any shortfall between the plan fund balance
and the actual cost of tuition.95 In exchange for this guarantee by
the state, a prepaid tuition plan would have to be structured so
that the state's general fund is not drained by continual subsidies
to the tuition plan.96 Two measures could accomplish this result: 1)
tie actual tuition increases to actuarial cost assumptions; and 2)
91. See Gunn, supra note 4, at 255-59.
92. See infra notes 108-138 and accompanying text.
93. See Philipps, supra note 1, at 336-40.
94. Gunn, supra note 4, at 255-59.
95. The State of Florida guarantees that the full tuition payments will be made to the
college or university to which the beneficiary matriculates. See supra note 85 and accompa-
nying text.
96. Further, from a political perspective, citizens of the state who either do not have
young children or do not plan to send their children to college may not welcome the idea of
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place the tuition plan under direct control of state government,
thereby eliminating the plan-level tax burden with a resultant in-
crease in plan after-tax revenue.
a. Tie Tuition Increases to Actuarial Expense Assumptions
Professor Lehman maintains that the inflation factor for future
tuition increases used by MET's actuaries was too low. 97 Accord-
ingly, if Michigan public colleges raised their tuition charges at a
rate in excess of the actuarial assumed rate, MET would be un-
derfunded. Since MET is an independent entity, there are no legal
restraints on the public colleges to keep them from outstripping
the MET fund balance by raising their tuition levels "too fast.""8
Professor Lehman projects that when cost underestimations are
combined with revenue overestimations, MET should have charged
approximately fifty percent more for its prepaid tuition contracts
in order to assure a sufficient fund balance to cover actual future
tuition costs.99
After MET began operations, Michigan public colleges an-
nounced tuition increases that exceeded MET's inflation assump-
tions.100 Instead of increasing prices for MET contracts, Michigan's
governor launched a lobbying campaign to pressure the colleges
into lowering their tuition increases.101 The colleges yielded and
lowered their projected tuition increases.102
Dependence on informal political pressure to force actual tuition
increases that approximate the actuarial assumptions of a prepaid
tuition program is obviously a poor way to proceed. A more direct
and legally binding control over both tuition increases and actua-
rial assumptions is preferable. Under this approach, one state
having their state taxes support the college expenses of the children of other citizens beyond
the current tuition subsidies for residents at state-sponsored institutions.
97. See Lehman, supra note 4, at 1072-76. MET's actuaries assumed a tuition inflation
rate of only 7.3%, while actual tuition inflation for Michigan public colleges for two succes-
sive ten-year periods beginning with the 1968-1969 school year equalled 8.7%. Id.
98. Conversely, there is no ultimate statutory requirement for MET to tie its tuition in-
flation assumptions directly to actual tuition increases charged by state colleges and univer-
sities. If the fund is insufficient, MET merely dissolves and distributes the fund balance to
the beneficiaries. MICH. Comp. LAWS § 390.1433(2) (1990).
99. See Lehman, supra note 4, at 1107.
100. See id. at 1114. Michigan public schools announced a weighted average tuition in-
crease of 12.4% in June of 1988, instead of the 7.3%. assumed by MET. Id.
101. See id. Governor Blanchard threatened to veto state appropriations for any univer-
sity that did not roll back its tuition increase to less than 10%. Id.
102. See id.
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agency would control the amount of tuition increases allowed for
public colleges and the actuarial assumptions used by the prepaid
tuition plan in arriving at the purchase price for a contract.
Such an agency could be administered by members of the tuition
plan as well as representatives from the state colleges.1 03 Thus,
both groups would have input into deciding long range increases in
tuition levels. This would yield some degree of cost control over
tuition increases which would benefit all the families within the
state that had children attending college, not just those who par-
ticipate in the prepaid tuition plan.104 Further, this approach
would make a major contribution to the actuarial soundness of the
plan fund.
Colleges, like many state governments, would be required to be
more fiscally responsible and the tuition plan would be required to
charge a more realistic price for a prepaid tuition contract. The
state's general fund would have some degree of certainty that the
cost assumptions underlying the prepaid tuition plan fund balance
would not be so understated as to require a massive subsidy from
the state general fund.
It would be naive to believe that state college authorities would
not resist strenuously a proposal such as this one. It would, after
all, result in a diminution of their independence. Even so, it ap-
pears to be preferable to the Michigan situation where all parties
seemed to go their merry ways until the governor stepped in.
b. Make the Tuition Plan an Integral Part of State Government
In addition to minimizing cost underestimation, a tuition plan
could increase its after-tax revenue by being structured as an inte-
gral part of the state government and thereby avoiding a plan-level
103. Alabama's plan provides that the Chancellor of the Alabama Department of Post-
Secondary Education will serve as a member of the board administering the plan. ALA. CODE
§ 16-33C-4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1990). Florida's plan provides that the Chancellor of the Board
of Regents and the Executive Director of the State Board of Community Colleges serve on
the plan's board. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.551(5) (West Supp. 1991).
104. Professor Lehman points out that colleges faced with tuition limits would cut spend-
ing and/or turn to other sources of revenue such as out-of-state students. See Lehman,
supra note 4, at 1116. However, in the Michigan scenario the actuarial assumptions were set
independently of and prior to the actual tuition increases. Both colleges and plan actuaries
should have significant input into setting one increase factor which will be used for both
purposes. This would generally result in a factor somewhat lower than the colleges prefer
and somewhat higher than the plan actuaries prefer.
[Vol. 26:281302
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income tax.10 5 The state agency described above would have final
authority over all plan decisions. All plan funds would be subject
to the general creditors of the state, and the state would have the
legal authority to use plan funds for non-educational purposes.106
This type of structure will 1) allow the state to control the fund
that it is guaranteeing will be sufficient to meet future tuition
costs, and 2) avoid the maze of uncertainties that face programs
like MET in determining the plan's potential tax liability.1 07 A tax-
exempt plan would provide a higher after-tax return to investors,
allowing lower prices for prepaid tuition contracts.
2. Disproportionate Benefit to Middle Income Groups
The most persistent objection to prepaid tuition programs seems
to boil down to the assertion that they provide too much benefit to
the middle class. 108 We agree that the programs mostly benefit
middle and upper-middle income citizens. However, we do not be-
lieve this to be a fatal flaw. A program to help middle class citizens
to provide higher education for their children is a real need at this
time. The proof lies in the public response to the programs that
have been put into operation. The number of contract purchases
has been at or above expectations, despite the criticisms and
problems with the plans. 09 Perhaps the purchasers are all mis-
guided or defrauded, but the members of the general public appar-
105. For a more complete discussion of the tax law treatment of integral parts of state
government, see supra notes 71-89 and accompanying text.
106. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027, supra note 2, at (P-H) 1 54,987:.
[MET] was created as a corporation to operate independently from [the State of
Michigan] under an appointed board of directors. Decisions by [MET's] board of di-
rectors, including those involving investment discretion, may not be overridden by
any state agency. [MET's] funds are not derived from [the State of Michigan] or one
of its political subdivisions, and by statute are not subject to the claims of [the State
of Michigan's] creditors and are not considered state money or common cash of the
state. [The State of Michigan] may not loan, transfer, or use [MET's] funds for any
purpose. [MET's] funds may only be used by [MET] for the tuition payment or re-
fund purposes expressly provided in the enabling legislation. These factors indicate
that [MET] is not an integral part of [the State of Michigan] or one of its political
subdivisions. Therefore, [MET's] income, unless otherwise excluded by statute, is
subject to federal income tax.
107. See Philipps, supra note 1, at 321-33; Lehman, supra note 4, at 1081-1106.
108. See ARTHUR M. HAUPTMAN, THE TUITION DILEMMA 82-85 (1990) (stating that govern-
ment programs should benefit the neediest students); Lehman, supra note 4, at 1038-41,
1053-55, 1110-13, 1134-41.
109. As of September 1990, Michigan had sold at least 90,000 contracts, Alabama had
sold at least 14,000 contracts and Florida had sold at least 101,000 contracts. McGuINNESS &
PAULSON, supra note 26, Section III.
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ently believe they need these programs, regardless of what the
professors tell them.
There is nothing wrong with a program that benefits the middle
income group. Professor Lehman asserts that the central function
of civil society is to create institutions "that will lead people to
think about others.""'  This seems connected to the egalitarian no-
tion that equality of condition (rather than equality of opportu-
nity) is the preeminent value to be accomplished by government.
However, liberty is at least co-equal to equality as a value to be
pursued. The government ought to maximize liberty within the
constraints of a civil society. The opportunity to obtain an educa-
tion of one's choice is a valued liberty. Moreover, an educated citi-
zenry is vital to the preservation of liberty.
Middle income citizens need help in educating their children.
College costs have historically risen at a rate about two percent
greater than the general inflation rate."' The middle income
groups are finding themselves with fewer educational choices. They
are increasingly unable to consider private schools, or even the
more expensive state institutions, as financially feasible choices."'
110. Lehman, supra note 4, at 1038.
111. Derek Bok, What's Wrong with Our Universities?, 14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 305,
325 (1991) (citing KENT HALSTEAD, HIGHER EDUCATION TUITION 20-21 (1989)). The cost of
higher education tuition went up faster in the decade of the 1980s than the cost of any other
good or service, including medical care. Statement of Arthur Hauptman, Educational Con-
sultant, American Council on Education, in Proceedings, Invitational Conference on Col-
lege Prepayment and Savings Plans 21 (1987). For the 1990-91 school year, the average
tuition increase for private colleges was about eight percent for private four year colleges
and seven percent for public four year colleges, with the general inflation rate remaining at
about five percent. Gary Putka, Private Colleges Tempering their Increases in Tuition,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1990, at B1 (citing the COLLEGE BOARD ANNUAL SURVEY OF COLLEGES
(1990)).
Another way to view the situation is to compare the rise in ,college costs to the rise in
disposable income. Between 1980 and 1987, disposable income grew at an average annual
rate of 6.5 percent. MINNESOTA HIGHER EDUCATION COORDINATING BOARD, STATE SAVING IN-
CENTIVE AND PREPAID TUITION PLANS 4 (1988). For the same period tuition and fees in-
creased at a rate of 9.8 percent. Id. This contrasts with the trend prior to the 1980s, when
disposable income increased more rapidly than the cost of attending college. Id. Professor
Lehman points out that all this is not as bad as it sounds at first, especially when one uses
the geometric difference between tuition inflation and general inflation. Lehman, supra note
4, at 1044-53. Nevertheless, Professor Lehman does acknowledge a middle class tuition
squeeze. Id. at 1051. His response is that middle class families should be willing to spend a
greater portion of their income on education if they value education so highly. Id. at 1049-
51.
112. Between 1980 and 1989, the cost of tuition, room, and board increased by 118% at
private universities and 106% at private four-year colleges. Similar costs rose 82% at public
universities and 77% at public colleges. These increases amounted to a range of 18% to 56%
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According to statistics provided by MET, sixty-four percent of
families purchasing MET contracts are in the $20,000 to $80,000
adjusted gross income range." 3 Professor Lehman points out that
MET's statistics are subject to varying interpretations." 4 However,
it seems safe to say that the bulk of MET contract purchasers
could be classified as middle income. Consider a family of four
with two small children in the mid-part of this range. Assume this
family has an adjusted gross income of $50,000 all consisting of
wage income. After federal income, FICA, and state income taxes
are considered, the average monthly take-home pay for this family
would be about $3,133."1 This makes the unlikely assumption that
there are no other deductions from the paychecks, such as for the
employee's share of medical insurance. So the take-home pay
might be even lower. While this is not an insubstantial income it
would not leave much left over after mortgage and car payments,
utility bills, groceries, school costs, commuting costs, insurance
premiums, medical bills, etc. Do these people need help with send-
ing their children to college? Is a private college in easy reach?"'
in real terms. Sandy Baum, The Need for College Savings, in COLLEGE SAVINGS PLANS 9
(Janet S. Hansen ed., 1990). See Thomas Toch & Ted Slafsky, The Great College Tumble
- Education is Becoming More Stratified by Class, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 3,
1991, at 50. Even at the 7.3% rate of college cost inflation for 1990, four years of tuition,
fees, room, and board at an average private institution will cost around $225,000 for a child
born in 1991. The Savings and Investment Act of 1991: Hearings on S. 612 Before the
Senate Committee on Finance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of Peter A. Roberts,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, College Savings Bank), reprinted in College Savings
Bank of Princeton Chairman Testifies on Bentsen-Roth IRA Bill, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug.
1, 1991, available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, TNT File, 91 TNT 161-37. Half of all college
students attended private schools in 1950. In 1990, 22% attended private institutions. Marj
Charlier, Ailing College Treats Student as Customer, and Soon is Thriving, WALL ST. J.,
July 17, 1991, at Al. The private institutions are there for those who can attend. Although
only 22% of students currently attend private institutions, almost half the existing institu-
tions of higher education are private. A. Kenneth Pye, What's Wrong with Our Universi-
ties? - An Additional View, 14 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 335, 337 (1991) (citing Arthur M.
Hauptman & Charles J. Andersen, Background Paper on American Higher Education, in
COMM'N ON NAT'L CHALLENGES IN HIGHER EDUC., MEMORANDUM TO THE 41ST PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES 16, 17 (1988)).
113. See Lehman, supra note 4, at 1134. Of the remaining 36%, 19% had adjusted gross
income in excess of $80,000 and 17% had adjusted gross income below $20,000.
114. Id. at 1134-41.
115. The 1991 payroll deductions would approximate $465 of federal wage withholding,
$319 of FICA, and $250 of state wage withholding (assuming the state tax at an average rate
of 6% of adjusted gross income). The total of these deductions is $1,034, which subtracted
from a gross monthly pay of $4,167 ($50,000 - 12 months) leaves a net paycheck of $3,133.
116. Under government guidelines for financial aid assistance this family sending one of
their children to college would have an "Expected Parental Contribution" of around $7,000
($583 per month), even if the family has no net assets. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, STU-
DENT AID AND THE COST OF POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION 16, Tbl. 2 (1991).
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Are they likely to save enough out of each paycheck to finance two
college educations? They are likely to be ineligible for low income
aid such as Pell grants. 117 The likelihood is that they will be faced
with taking on substantial debt when it comes time for their chil-
dren to attend college, especially if they attend a private college.1
8
How would a tuition prepayment plan help? The key would be a
regularized savings plan that could be marketed by either the state
or private organizations. This can be accomplished by permitting
prepayment contracts to be purchased on an installment basis." 9
Most people simply do not save enough in advance to make large
lump-sum expenditures. But they do manage to make installment
payments on a month-to-month basis, because they can budget the
installments into their periodic income. The paradox is that many
people save by borrowing, and then paying back on the installment
plan. At the end of the payment period they have an asset they
would not have had without borrowing. Not many houses or
automobiles would be sold if they had to be paid for in a lump
sum. The same principle can apply to prepaid tuition plans.
117. See Kenneth J. Cooper, Election-Year Issue Looms: Aiding Poor or Middle-Class
College Student, WASH. POST, June 12, 1991, at A21.
118. A recent survey by the American College Testing Service concluded that families
need an income of about $50,000 to cover costs of a two year community college out of
current income and about $95,000 for a private college. The Savings and Investment Incen-
tive Act of 1991: Hearings on S. 612 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991) (statement of William J. Byron, S.J., President, The Catholic University of
America), reprinted in Association of Independent Colleges and Universities Official Testi-
fies on Bentsen-Roth IRA Bill, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 2, 1991, available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, TNT file, 91 TNT 162-31. Loans have replaced grants as the major source of fed-
eral student assistance. Margaret A. Schenet, Higher Education: Reauthorization of the
Higher Education Act CRS-3 (CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE: ISSUE BRIEF 1991). A re-
port in the Washington Post is illustrative:
Linda A. Martinelli of Cranston, Rhode Island complained in an interview that her
family, whose annual income is about $35,000, has been ineligible for Pell Grants. It
took $25,000 in commercial loans, as well as $17,500 in guaranteed student loans to
educate her daughter, Lisa, at Salve Regina College, a small Catholic school.
Cooper, supra note 117, at A21. Rising educational debt loads are now recognized as a seri-
ous problem for the middle class. See Pye, supra note 112, at 351-52; J. Timothy Philipps &
Timothy G. Hatfield, Uncle Sam Gets the Goldmine - Students Get the Shaft: Federal
Tax Treatment of Student Loan Indebtedness, 15 SEToN HALL LEGIS. J. 249 (1991); Wm. J.
Kenny, Establishing a Program to Provide for College Cost Requires Careful Planning af-
ter TAMRA, TAX'N FOR LAW. 56 (July/Aug. 1989); Roy A. Knight & Lee G. Knight, New
Ways to Manage Soaring Tuition Costs, 167 J. AccT. 46 (March 1989); Michael S. McPher-
son and Mary Skinner, Paying for College: A Lifetime Proposition, 4 BROOKINGS REV. 29
(1986).
119. MET, and the Alabama and Florida plans all permit some form of installment pay-
ment for prepaid tuition contracts. See MICH. Comp. LAWS § 390.1426(1)(b) (1988); ALA.
CODE § 16-33C-5(11) (Cum. Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 240.551(5)(c)(17) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
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If the opportunity to purchase these plans on an installment ba-
sis is made widely available and if the plans are adequately mar-
keted, prepaid tuition plans could become as commonly used as
IRAs were in their heyday.120 This would be especially effective if
the installment plan could be combined with payment by volun-
tary payroll deduction. Each month our hypothetical family would
simply have an additional amount deducted from its paychecks for
the purchase of prepaid tuition. The availability of prepaid install-
ment tuition plans would aid lower-middle income families who
find it difficult to save voluntarily.121
The education of all citizens has long been recognized as a
proper function of government. 122 Chief Justice Warren recognized
this in Brown v. Board of Education123 when he wrote:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is re-
quired in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship.1 24
Every government program does not have to result in redistribu-
tion of wealth from the rich to the poor. Egalitarianism is not the
only proper standard for measuring the worth of a government
program. Education is such a fundamental value that we, as a soci-
ety, have chosen to make it available on a non-need basis in many
120. See Janet S. Hansen, Introduction and Overview, in COLLEGE SAVINGS PLANS 4 (Ja-
net S. Hansen ed., 1990).
121. Series EE bonds are currently available on a payroll deduction plan. The interest on
these bonds can be tax-free when the bond redemption proceeds are used for qualified edu-
cational purposes, and the taxpayer meets other requirements of the statute. See I.R.C. §
135 (1988). The exclusion is phased out between modified adjusted gross income levels of
$60,000 and $90,000 for married couples filing joint returns. For single taxpayers and heads
of household the phaseout range is between $40,000 and $55,000. Id. § 135(b)(2)(A). The
threshold phaseout amounts are indexed for inflation beginning in 1991. Id. § 135(b)(2)(B).
Bond purchasers who were under age 24 on the date of the bond's issuance and married
taxpayers filing separate returns are not eligible for the exclusion. Id. § 135(c)(1)(B),(d)(2).
The government has taken some steps to market these bonds for educational purposes. The
adequacy of that effort has not been established. See Bank Sues Treasury Over "Decep-
tive" Advertising, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1991, at C15.
122. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 587-88 (1946) (Stone, C.J., concurring);
Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439, 449, 452 (1938).
123. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
124. Id. at 493.
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contexts. The wealthiest citizens are free to send their children to
public school and to state supported institutions of higher
education.
Up to now, higher education has been more accessible in the
United States than in any other country.125 However, the growth in
access to higher education has slipped in the past decade. 12 It is
safe to assume that the increasing difficulty of financing a college
education is at least partly responsible for that.
Families have three sources of funds available for college finance:
savings, current income, and loans. Many families are likely to use
a combination of the three, 27 with loans becoming increasingly
prominent.' 2 Families appear not to be saving enough for college
costs. A widely quoted 1984 study found that only about half the
families who plan to have a child attend college were currently sav-
.125. Joint Committee on Taxation, Factors Affecting the International Competitiveness
of the United States (JCS-6-91), 56-57, May 30, 1991, reprinted in BNA Special Supple-
ment, Report No. 107, June 4, 1991. [hereinafter International Competitiveness]. Only Can-
ada comes close in terms of percentage of college age students enrolled at institutions of
higher education as the following table illustrates:
Enrollment Rates for Postsecondary Education in
Selected Countries, 1985
Country
Australia ........................
C anada ............................
C hina ...... . .. ..................
West Germany .................
France ................ .... ......
Italy . .............................
Japan ..................... ...
M exico .............................
Soviet Union ... ..................
Sw eden ............................
United Kingdom ....................
United States .......................
Postsecondary Postsecondary
enrollment students per
rates (percent) inhabitants 100,000
29 2,464
55 5,090
2 168
30 2,546
30 2,362
26 2,065
30 2,006
16 1,529
21 1,847
37 2,650
21 1,795
57 5,145
Id. at 56.
126. The median years of school completed by persons aged 25-29 reached a peak of 12.9
in 1976. That figure remained stable until 1987, when it declined to 12.8 years. The propor-
tion of 25-29 year-olds who completed four or more years of college increased from 11.1% in
1960 to 16.3% in 1970. During the 1980s this percentage stayed virtually unchanged at 22%.
International Competitiveness, supra note 125, at 57.
127. MINNESOTA HIGHER EDUCATION COORDINATING BOARD, STATE SAVING INCENTIVE AND
PREPAID TUITION PLANS 11 (1988).
128. See Cooper, supra note 117.
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ing anything for that purpose. Moreover, for those who did save,
the level of saving was glaringly inadequate. 12 9
One reason families undersave for college costs may be that the
available savings options appear inadequate in light of anticipated
college costs.130 For a small saver the common alternatives for cash
saving are savings accounts, series EE bonds, municipal bonds, life
insurance policies, common stocks, and annuities. Except for com-
mon stocks, the rate of return on these alternatives has historically
been below the rate of college cost inflation. 31 Many middle in-
come persons have neither the time, temperament, nor talent to
engage in a sophisticated investment program. They do not have
adequate information to make investment choices. Appropriate in-
vestment vehicles are not readily available. Prepaid tuition plans
can meet both these needs when advertised and made available on
an installment payment basis. Prepaid tuition contracts are sold in
large numbers in states where they are widely publicized and read-
ily available.1 32 Prepaid tuition programs offer the middle class
saver an opportunity to take advantage of the expertise and mar-
129. Tax Incentives for Education: Hearing Before the Senate Finance Committee,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 194, 203 nn.1-2 (1988) (statement of John D. Finnerty, Executive
Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer, College Savings Bank) (citing ROPER ORGANIZA-
TION, A NATIONAL STUDY ON PARENTAL SAVINGS FOR CHILDREN'S HIGHER EDUCATION Ex-
PENSES 5 (National Institute of Independent Colleges and Universities Aug. 1984)). The
overall median level of saving was only $517 (about $650-700 in current dollars) per year,
and families tended to wait until the child was within five or six years of college to begin
saving. The study also indicated that 70% of families with 1984 incomes in excess of $30,000
did some saving for college. Their median savings level was $904 in 1984. Adjusted for sub-
sequent inflation, the current median yearly saving amount for these families would be
about $1,300-1400. Id. Another study was more optimistic. Of all households with children
under 18, only 6% indicated that they did not save for any reason. The rest of the families
had savings, but only 34% indicated they were saving specifically for college expenses. A.
Charlene Sullivan, Saving for College: The Investment Challenge, in COLLEGE SAVINGS
PLANS 18, 21 (Janet S. Hansen ed., 1990). However, these same families had debt payments
amounting to about 30% of their pre-tax income, and most of their savings was in the form
of checking and savings accounts, certificates of deposit, and money market funds. Id. at 23.
130. Most people, when asked, overestimate rather than underestimate the cost of attend-
ing college. MINNESOTA HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 127, at 11. One authority has blamed
college cost sticker shock for causing a college saving paralysis. The Savings and Investment
Act of 1991: Hearings on S. 612 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991) (statement of Peter A. Roberts, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, College
Savings Bank), reprinted in College Savings Bank of Princeton Chairman Testifies on
Bentsen-Roth IRA Bill, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Li-
brary, TNT File, 91 TNT 161-37.
131. See Richard Anderson, Prepaying for Higher Education: Why it Works 4-7 (paper
presented to the American Economics Association Dec. 29, 1988, and to the Brookings Insti-
tution Dec. 6, 1988).
132. See supra note 109.
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ket power that a large sophisticated investor can exercise.' The
poor and the middle class are two distinct groups that find financ-
ing a college education difficult. Different policies are needed for
each.134 To the extent that middle income parents save for their
children's education, financial resources are available for tuition
aid to poorer students. 35 More emphasis on saving will ultimately
ameliorate the financial burden government now bears with subsi-
dization of loan programs.136 Finally, middle class voters are less
likely to support educational policies that they perceive as being
modern day versions of Robin Hood, taking resources from the
middle class to benefit only the poor. 37
Prepaid tuition plans offer an attractive policy choice for meet-
ing the college finance needs of the middle class. They provide an
educational savings vehicle for those citizens who have proven
themselves to be most ambitious and productive in the market-
place, who practice the value of thrift, and who take seriously the
obligation to provide for the education of their children. What is
wrong with that? These citizens do have a special moral claim, as
Professor Lehman would require, 3 8 to assistance from the govern-
ment in providing their children with an education. That claim lies
in the contributions these citizens make to the commonwealth.
III. PROPOSALS
The current situation with respect to prepaid tuition plans can
be improved in two ways. First, prepaid tuition plans should be
granted tax favored treatment by Congress. Second, prepaid tui-
tion plans can be improved by involving the private sector, widen-
ing college choice, and making them more accessible to the average
citizen.
A. Tax Favored Status for Prepaid Tuition Plans
The tax status of prepaid tuition plans currently is uncertain. If
the IRS is correct in its holding that state plans are taxable, the
133. For a fuller discussion of the investment advantages that prepaid tuition plans offer
to the small investor, see Philipps, supra note 1, at 338-40.
134. Janet S. Hansen, Introduction and Overview, in COLLEGE SAVINGS PLANS4 (Janet S.
Hansen ed., 1990).
135. See Pye, supra note 112, at 339.
136. See statement of Peter A. Roberts, supra note 130.
137. See id.; Cooper, supra note 117, at A21.
138. See Lehman, supra note 4, at 1053.
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results for those plans will be detrimental to say the least.13 The
same would be true if the purchasers of prepaid tuition plans are
ultimately taxed as Professor Gunn suggests they might.140 Taxa-
tion of the student receiving educational services, while probably
not as harmful, is still a disincentive to purchase the plans.'
The tax system should encourage, not discourage, the idea of
prepaid tuition plans. As long as the current situation exists, states
will be reluctant to experiment with plans in the face of possible
theadverse tax consequences, and the private sector will be even
more disinclined to do so.143 It is a simple maxim that if govern-
ment wants to discourage something the government should tax it;
if the government wants to encourage something the government
should grant a tax break. Prepaid tuition plans should be en-
couraged and be given a tax break.
Congress should enact legislation that 1) exempts the plan itself
from income tax, and 2) exempts parent and child from tax on the
difference between the price of the plan contract and the value of
the educational services received. This proposal exempts from tax
any investment income that results from saving for college. It is
similar to the super IRA recently proposed by Senators Bentsen
and Roth. 44 The initial payment (or payments) for the contract
would not be deductible.
The tax benefits would be backloaded. The disadvantage of
backloading the plan is that it probably provides less psychological
incentive than front-loading the tax benefit by making the initial
payment deductible, but taxing the payout. Nevertheless, the eco-
139. See Gunn, supra note 4, at 257-59; Lehman, supra note 4, at 1106-08.
140. See Gunn, supra note 4, at 254.
141. The student presumably would be in the lowest marginal tax bracket. Nevertheless,
payment of a tax would present a cash-flow problem for the student who would be taxed on
the receipt of services in kind with no accompanying cash to pay the tax.
142. See supra note 74.
143. The College Savings Bank in Princeton, New Jersey offers certificates of deposit with
interest rates indexed to rising college costs as a form of prepaid tuition plan. The bank
issues the CollegeSure CD, a certificate of deposit that the thrift guarantees will pay at least
the average one-year tuition at a four-year private college upon maturity. Bob Webster,
Lifestyle, UPI, Feb. 5, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file (Feb. 12, 1990). A
St. Paul-based company, Hemar Education Corp. of America, reportedly was working on a
plan but awaiting IRS rulings. Charles Child, Private Tuition Fund Ceases Operations,
CRAIN's DETROIT Bus., Aug. 27, 1990. A company in Ann Arbor, Michigan, National TMO,
attempted to start a private plan but reportedly has ceased operations. Id.
144. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Description and Analysis of S. 612 (Savings and
Investment Act of 1991), (JCS-5-91), 1, May 14, 1991, reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA),
May 16, 1991, at L-1 (No. 95).
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nomic incentive of a backloaded plan is exactly the same as for a
front-loaded plan, assuming the taxpayer's marginal rates do not
change from year to year.145
1. Encouragement to College Saving
The proposed legislation would provide tax neutrality between
the decision to consume or to save for college, unlike the current
law, which is biased in favor of the decision to consume.1, 6 This
bias results from the fact that both saved income and the invest-
ment return that the saved income generates are each taxed. 147 For
example, assume first that there is no income tax, and taxpayer
can earn a ten percent return on saved income. If taxpayer earns
$1,000, taxpayer has the choice of spending the $1,000 on current
consumption or saving it and earning an additional $100 income.
The price of each dollar of additional income is ten percent in fore-
gone current consumption. 4
Suppose there is a twenty-five percent income tax in the same
situation. After taxes there is $750 left of the original $1,000
earned. If taxpayer invests this $750 at ten percent, taxpayer re-
ceives $75 additional income. This $75 income is subject to the
twenty-five percent tax, leaving an after-tax return of $56.25. The
twenty-five percent tax raises the cost in foregone current con-
sumption of each additional dollar of income from $10 to $13.33
145. A simple example will illustrate this point. Assume taxpayer has a 28% marginal tax
rate, earns a 10% return on investment, and has $1,000 income to invest in a prepaid tuition
plan. Taxpayer contributes the earnings to a frontloaded plan in which contributions are
deductible and the payout is taxable. The $1,000 will grow to $1,100 at the end of a year,
and the total tax due is $308, leaving taxpayer with $792 net at the end of a year under a
frontloaded plan. Now assume a backloaded plan in which the initial contribution is not
deductible, but for which there is no tax on the payout. Taxpayer would have $720 to con-
tribute after taxes on the $1,000 income. At the end of a year with a 10% return taxpayer
would be left with $792 after taxes, exactly the same as under the frontloaded plan. See id.
at 26-33; Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at L-8 to L-10. This analysis is independent of the number
of years the investment is held. The economic effects of the backloaded plan will be the
same as the frontloaded plan assuming the marginal tax rates remain the same. Id. at 27,
reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at L-8.
146. The arguments here concerning tax neutrality and tax expenditures have been made
in prior articles. See Philipps, supra note 1, at 342-45; Philipps & Hatfield, supra note 118,
at 285-87. We restate them in this article for the convenience of the reader.
147. See NORMAN B. TURE & STEPHEN J. ENTIN, SAVE, AMERICA. A PRIMER ON U.S. SAVING
AND ITS EFFECT ON ECONOMIC HEALTH 15-18 (Institute for Research and Taxation 1989).
148. Id. This discussion assumes that investment is a substitute good for current con-
sumption, because investment is equivalent to deferred consumption. See JOSEPH M. DODGE.
THE LOGIC OF TAX 326 (1989).
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($750 foregone current consumption -- $56.25 additional income).
Hence, the twenty-five percent tax raises the foregone current con-
sumption cost of saving by thirty-three percent.14 9
If the situation is exactly the same, except that the investment
income is exempt from income tax, the $750 after-tax income when
saved produces $75 additional income on which no tax is paid.
Consequently, the cost of one dollar additional income is $10, the
same as in the no-tax situation. Hence, there is no bias in favor of
consumption, and tax neutrality exists between the consumption
and saving decisions. 150
Would tax favored status such as the one proposed actually re-
sult in increased saving for college? Or would it merely shift sav-
ings from currently existing investments to prepaid tuition plans?
There seems to be no agreement on the similar question of
whether IRAs cause new savings or merely cause savings to be
shifted from other investments to IRAs. 5' Nevertheless, there is
no denying that taxpayers did use IRAs heavily when they were
widely available and intensively marketed. 5 2 If the private sector
could offer a tax favored prepaid tuition plan such as suggested
below, the IRA experience indicates that marketing efforts would
result in a widespread public response. As one economist has said,
referring to the IRA boom in the 1980s, "It may well be that sav-
ing, like life insurance, is sold, not bought.' 53 This suggests that
tax favored status can at least exercise influence over an important
incentive to saving: encouragement of saving by third parties.
5 4
2. Cost
The most basic objection to tax favored status for prepaid tui-
tion plans is that it. costs too much. This is bolstered with the ar-
gument that such plans disproportionately benefit middle and up-
per income taxpayers. Critics argue why grant a "tax expenditure"
to a program that benefits the middle and upper income groups
rather than the lowest income groups? The argument ultimately
149. TURE & ENTIN, supra, note 147, at 16.
150. Id. at 17.
151. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 144, at 36-43, reprinted in Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), May 16, 1991, at p. L-11 to L-13 (No. 95).
152. Id.
153. Janet S. Hansen, Introduction and Overview, in COLLEGE SAVINGS PLANS 4 (Janet S.
Hansen ed., 1990) (quoting economist Lawrence Summers).
154. Id.
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
relies on tax expenditure theory to establish that tax favored sta-
tus would "cost" the government too much in the form of lost rev-
enues, and hence should not be undertaken in an era of budget
deficits. Any new initiatives in the area of higher education they-
argue should be reserved for the poor. 155
This argument is appealing. No one wants to be against the
poor. Nevertheless, the middle class needs help too. 56 This propo-
sal would benefit the middle class without necessarily harming
lower income groups. Middle class tax relief is an idea being es-
poused across the political spectrum, 57 and so is aid to middle
class taxpayers in providing their children with a higher
education. 158
Tax favored status for prepaid tuition plans is a vehicle for pro-
viding tax relief in a way that targets one of the most worrisome
financial burdens of middle class taxpayers: providing an education
for their children. There are two large components in the American
dream: owning one's own home and providing one's children with a
college education. The tax system has many features that en-
courage the first of these, home ownership. 59 In contrast, powerful
governmental incentives to save for higher education do not exist.
The initiatives of states with baccalaureate bonds'60 and the fed-
155. See HAUPTMAN, supra note 108, at 84; Lehman, supra note 4, at 1054-55.
156. See supra notes 108-138 and accompanying text.
157. Tax Report, Middle-Class Tax Relief Tops the Agenda for Congressional Demo-
crats, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 4, 1991, at Al; A letter signed by 156 Democrats in the House of
Representatives recently urged the Democratic leadership initiate a plan to cut taxes for the
middle class. See House Democrats Urge Leadership to Act on Tax Relief for Middle-In-
come Families, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), July 24, 1991, at G-5 (No. 142). A study by the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities indicates an economic squeeze on the middle class
over the past decade. See Study Says Tax Changes Exacerbated Growing Trend Toward
Income Inequality, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), July 24, 1991, at G-1 to G-2 (No. 142).
158. For example, Senator Bill Bradley has recently proposed a government sponsored
loan program aimed at helping the middle class pay for college. See Congressional News
Release, Bradley Announces New Student Aid Plan, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 2, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 91 TNT 162-21. Senator Bradley stated that he
was introducing his initiative because, "[T]he middle class is finding itself 'too wealthy' to
afford college." Id.
159. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3),(4) (1988) (home mortgage interest deduction); id. § 1034 (the
tax-free rollover of gain on sale of a principal residence); id. § 121 (the exclusion of gain on
sale of a principal residence by a person age 55 or older); id. § 1014 (the step-up in basis of
an asset at death). BORIS F. BrrrKxER AND LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, AND GIFTS 5-15 to 5-21 (2d ed. 1989) (the exclusion from gross income of unrealized
asset appreciation). All afford powerful incentives for home ownership.
160. See Philipps, supra note 1, at 294-95.
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eral government with tax exempt Series EE bonds 161 have thus far
been fairly limited."6 2
Moreover, one should question the slavish adherence to the tax
expenditure concept that is the order of the day in current tax pol-
icy analysis.0 3 The idea is based on the notion that in an ideal
income tax all economic income - defined as personal consump-
tion plus wealth accumulation6 4 - should be taxed. The next step
is to assert that deviations from this ideal income tax base re-
present indirect subsidies or tax expenditures for those who pay
less tax because of the deviation.6 5
161. See supra note 121.
162. The federal government has actually removed several incentives for college saving
that previously existed. The 1986 Tax Act removed the Clifford Trust. See I.R.C. § 671
(1988). Also, it imposed a tax rate equal to the parent's rate on the unearned income of
children under age 14. See id. § 1(g). This removed income splitting possibilities available
under prior law.
163. This apparently is related to the vogue for analyzing social problems in economic
terms. While economic analysis is a useful tool, it is often overdone. The fact is "we live in a
society not an economy." Jerry Avorn, Benefit and Cost Analysis in Geriatric Care, 310
NEW ENG. J. MED. 644 (1984) (quoting R. Fein, On Measuring Economic Benefits of Health
Programs, in MEDICAL HISTORY AND MEDICAL CARE: A SYMPOSIUM OF PERSPECTIVES 179-220
(1971)).
164. This is a version of the familiar Haig-Simons definition of income:
the algebraic sum of 1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and 2)
the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end
of the term in question.
See Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income - Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921) ("income is money value of the net
accretion to one's economic power"); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50
(1938) (consumption plus net change in wealth); William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions
in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L. REv. 309, 320-25 (1972). See generally, ANTHONY B.
ATKINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF INEQUALITY 35-60 (1975).
165. For a classic exposition of the tax expenditure concept, see Stanley S. Surrey, Tax
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct
Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REv. 705 (1970). This article was amplified in Stan-
ley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments
and Emerging Issues,'20 B.C.L. REv. 225 (1979). See generally, STANLEY SURREY, PATHWAYS
TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX ExPENDITURES (1973). Congress has enacted the tax
expenditure concept into law. The statute requires Congress to examine tax expenditures as
part of budgetary policy. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 3(a)(3), 101(c), 102(a), 88 Stat. 297, 299, 300, 300-01 (codified at 2
U.S.C. § 622 (1988)). The statute also requires the President to include tax expenditures as
an item in his recommended budget. See id. § 601, 88 Stat. 297, 323-24 (codified at 31
U.S.C. § 1105(a)(16) (1988)). For a brief history of the tax expenditure concept, see Allaire
Urban Karzon & Charles H. Coffin, Extension of the At-Risk Concept to the Investment
Tax Credit: A Shotgun Approach to the Tax Shelter Problem, 1982 DUKE L.J. 847, 850
n.13.
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The tax expenditure is measured by the revenue foregone by the
government on account of deviation from the ideal. For example,
the tax expenditure from granting tax favored status to prepaid
tuition plans would be measured by the amount of excluded in-
come multiplied by the applicable tax rate. However, as presently
formulated, the measurement of foregone revenue is inaccurate,
because it fails to take into account changes in taxpayer behavior
that will occur if a deviation from the ideal income tax base is
eliminated. Consequently, it is incorrect to assert that excluding an
item of income will decrease government revenue by an amount
equivalent to the product of the excluded income times the appli-
cable tax rate.1 6  The existence or not of the exclusion will, in it-
self, affect the amount of foregone revenue.
16 1
The tax expenditure concept also fails to take a long view. Per-
haps granting a tax favored status to prepaid tuition plans may
result in short-term revenue loss. Nevertheless, it will also result in
long-term revenue gain, if the exclusion fosters a better educated
and, hence, higher earning work-force. Moreover, there are indica-
tions that even the short-term revenue loss measured in tax expen-
diture terms might not be too great. A recent study for the Ohio
Tuition Trust Authority by the Coopers & Lybrand accounting
firm indicated that the direct revenue loss of exempting all invest-
ment income of state prepaid tuition plans would be about $450
million over a five year period. 168 If Congress needs a revenue off-
set for this "expenditure," it should repeal the current interest de-
duction on second home mortgages. 69 The tax expenditure concept
assumes that income, broadly defined, is the proper tax base. This
assumption assumes the very issue to be decided: the proper deft-
166. See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Michael J. Boskin, Impact of Recent Developments in
Public Finance Theory on Policy Decisions, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 295 (1977).
167. A good example of the failure to take changes in taxpayer behavior into, account is
the revenue estimates made in the 1990 budget agreement. Revenues are now expected to
fall far short of the original predictions. See Matthew B. Kibbe, The Laffer Curve in Re-
verse, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1991, at AS.
168. John G. Wilkins, Estimated Impact on Federal Revenues Resulting from Providing
Tax-Exempt Treatment to Income Accrued By State-Created Trusts Administering Tui-
tion Prepayment Programs at Table 1 (Sept. 1, 1990) (Coopers & Lybrand study entitled
Estimate of Federal Tax Revenues Resulting from Providing Tax-Exempt Treatment to
Income Accrued by State-Created Trusts Administering Tuition Prepayment Programs),
reprinted in Wilkins Proposed Exemption of Tuition Trust Income from Federal Income
Tax, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Oct. 9, 1990, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 90
TNT 206-21).
169. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A) (1988) (granting an interest deduction for mortgage inter-
est paid on loans secured by a taxpayer's principal residence plus one other residence).
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nition of the tax base. The appropriate measure of income to in-
clude in the tax base is the essential question of tax policy. Simply
because we call the tax an income tax does not mean that every-
thing an economist might call income presumptively should be in-
cluded in the tax base. Viewed from the perspective of saving/con-
sumption neutrality, a tax that exempts some income derived from
saving may be more appropriate. 170 Moreover, there are cogent ar-
guments that educational expenses are more akin to income earn-
ing expenditures than to consumption expenditures, and, hence,
should receive more favorable tax treatment.'1 Slavish devotion to
the tax expenditure analysis hinders the analysis of proposals for
tax relief via deductions or exclusions with intellectual blinders.
B. An Illustrative Plan
The following plan is an illustration of how a prepaid college tui-
tion plan might be structured to answer some of the critics' objec-
tions, and also provide an opportunity for private sector involve-
ment. The plan is admittedly sketchy and is not a finished
product. Nevertheless, it is useful as a vehicle for further
discussion.
The proposed College Savings Trust'172 (CST) has several goals
as a tuition funding vehicle. First, a CST would be a privately
funded and operated entity that would allow parents to pre-fund
the tuition costs of their children. Second, a CST would provide
real insurance against tuition inflation (i.e., a tuition guarantee).
Third, a CST would allow children a wide choice of colleges-to at-
tend. Fourth, a CST would provide parents with the opportunity
to earn a higher after-tax rate of return than a regular savings ac-
count or government bonds. Finally, a CST should be easily acces-
sible to middle and lower income families. Instead of direct govern-
ment aid to the financially less fortunate, federal legislation for
CSTs would operate as a catalyst to extend the benefits of private
enterprise to middle and lower income families.
170. See supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
171. See Brian E. Lebowitz, On the Mistaxation of Investment in Human Capital, 52
TAx NoTEs 825 (1991).
172. The authors acknowledge the similarity of the proposed CST plan with the National
Education Savings Trust bills. S. 1572, H.R. 3252 & H.R. 2509, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
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1. Tax Treatment
Under the legislation we propose, 173 payments to a CST would
not be deductible, but neither the child nor the parent would real-
ize any tax liability upon the purchase of CST credits.174 A CST,
however, would not pay taxes on the investment income it earned.
Further, payments of tuition to a qualified college 17 5 would not be
taxable to the student. 7  In order to provide a broad range of col-
lege choices, federal legislation could require a minimum number
of colleges to participate in a CST before it became qualified for a
tax-exemption.
2. Basic Operation
A CST could operate like a defined contribution pension plan
with a four year payout. 77 Colleges could become members of a
CST if they agreed to be legally bound to accept CST tuition cred-
173. See supra notes 139-71 and accompanying text.
174. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027, supra note 2, at (P-H) 1 54,986-87 held that the plan pur-
chaser made a taxable gift to the beneficiary by purchasing a prepaid tuition contract.
Philipps, supra note 1, at 300. We address only the income tax results in our legislative
proposal. However, it would be possible to extend the $10,000 annual exclusion to purchase
of prepaid tuition contracts by making an exception to the present interest requirement for
the annual exclusion.
175. Presumably, qualifications similar to those set forth in I.R.C. § 135(c)(3) (1988)
could be used to determine which institutions could be CST members. The relevant por-
tions of § 135(c)(3) provide as follows:
[t]he term "eligible educational institution" means an institution described in section
1201(a) or subparagraph (C) or (D) of sections 481(a)(1) of the Higher Education Act
of 1965 (as in effect on October 21, 1988), and area vocational education school (as
defined in subparagraph (C) or (D) of section 521(3) of the Carl D. Perkins Voca-
tional Education Act) which is in any State (as defined in section 527(27) of such
Act), as such sections are in effect on October 21, 1988.
I.R.C. § 135(c)(3) (1988).
176. Id. If it were thought necessary to prevent this tax benefit from accruing to more
wealthy taxpayers, the exemption for the earnings portion of the payments made on behalf
of the student could be phased-out for parents with adjusted gross incomes in certain
ranges. This phase-out level could be increased by a specified amount per child under 18
and should be indexed for inflation. I.R.C. § 135(b)(2) provides a somewhat similar type of
phase-out for the exemption for interest income on U.S. savings bond used to finance higher
education. However, any phase-out should be set at a realistic level. Senator Bradley, in his
proposed student loan legislation, eschews a needs test altogether. See Congressional News
Release, Bradley Announces New Student Aid Plan, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Aug. 2, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 91 TNT 162-21.
177. The actual payouts could be determined by when the selected college charges tuition
to its students (e.g., on a quarterly or semester basis).
318
PREPAID COLLEGE TUITION
its as payment upon the matriculation of a CST participant.17 1
Member colleges (public or private) would have to set the number
of tuition credits each college would charge for four years of tui-
tion. The price per credit would be determined by the plan actua-
ries, taking into account expected tuition inflation and investment
return. For example:
Example CST Tuition Credit Schedule
Tuition Credits Required
College for 4 Years of Tuition
A-(Public, Resident) 40
B-(Public, Non-Resident) 65
X-(Private) 95
Y-(Private) 100
Z-(Private) 120
Price Per Credit = $400
A parent in our example could purchase ninety tuition credits
from the CST. Eighteen years later, if his child is accepted and
decides to attend College Y, the parent would instruct the CST to
pay College Y the CST fund balance equivalent to ninety credits
over a four year period.179 The parent or child would have to fi-
nance the balance of the cost at College Y with cash, loans, etc.
If the child in the example attends College A, the full four years
of tuition would be paid for by the CST. The fifty extra credits
(ninety credits purchased minus forty credit cost) would be re-
funded to the parent or child. The portion of this refund that rep-
resented earnings on the original purchase price would be taxable
to the recipient. In addition, a ten percent surcharge on the entire
refund could be charged by the CST to discourage parents from
178. A college would be allowed to terminate its membership in a CST at its discretion.
However, the termination would be effective for prospective student classes only. The termi-
nating college would still have to accept tuition credits from the CST for students that
purchased the credits prior to the withdrawal of the bollege. Thus, the student would be
guaranteed tuition credit at any of the colleges which were members of the CST when his
parents purchased the credits. Of course, the student would have to meet the requisite aca-
demic entrance requirements of a college prior to being eligible to offset tuition with CST
credits.
179. The fund balance in this case would equal the original purchase price of $36,000 (90
credits at $400 per credit) plus any earnings up to 90% (90 credits purchased divided by 100
credits cost) of current tuition costs at College Y.
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purposely over-funding CST balances in order to take advantage of
the tax deferred investment income.
a. Access
Allowing parents to purchase tuition credits through payroll de-
ductions could provide easy access to a CST.180 The CST could
provide for five, ten, and fifteen year payment plans. This type of
payment plan would bring the high after-tax return, tuition guar-
antee, and educational benefits formerly available only to upper
income taxpayers to middle and lower income taxpayers. In our
example, if a middle income parent wanted to purchase ninety tui-
tion credits, the lump sum price would be $36,000 (ninety credits
at $400). However, if the parent could spread payments to the CST
over fifteen years, the parent.could purchase ninety credits for ap-
proximately $314 per month. Likewise, a lower income taxpayer
probably could not afford to pay $16,000 for forty tuition credits.
However, the same taxpayer could more easily afford a monthly
payment of approximately $140 for fifteen years. 181
b. Disposition of Earnings
If a CST's earnings outpaced tuition inflation, the excess would
inure to the member colleges. For example, assume a member col-
lege has a CST tuition charge of 100 CST units and that its dollar
tuition charges are $80,000 for four years of tuition when a student
matriculates. If the CST fund balance at that time exceeds $800
per credit, the college would receive the entire fund balance up to
100 credits worth. 182 If a CST's earnings lagged behind actual tui-
180. The Michigan, Alabama, and Florida plans all allow payroll deduction funding al-
ready. 1990 MICHIGAN EDUCATION TRUST MONTHLY PURCHASE FULL BENEFITS CONTRACT;
PREPAID AFFORDABLE COLLEGE TUITION: THE WALLACE-FOLSOM PREPAID COLLEGE TUITION
TRUST FUND 3 (1991) (brochure); Florida Prepaid College Program, 7-10 (1989) (brochure).
While the mechanics of payroll deduction funding are simple when there is one state plan,
they would become more complex if there were several alternative CSTs. Accordingly, the
CSTs would have to make arrangements with banks to collect payments on their behalf.
Alternatively, participants .could be allowed to mail in their payments.
181. The monthly payments amounts used here assume an interest rate of 6.5% which a
tax-exempt CST could afford to charge (as opposed to the 8.5% rate a taxable bank might
charge).
182. Any excess over 100 credits would be returned to the parent as a refund. For exam-
ple, if a parent purchased 110 credits and his child attended a 100 credit college, the parent
would receive a refund of cash equivalent to approximately 9% (ten excess credits divided
by 110 total credits purchased) of his child's CST fund balance. The IRS could impose a
10% penalty on the amount refunded.
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tion inflation at the selected college, that college would bear the
cost differential. 183 To the extent earnings equaled tuition inflation
expectations, they would be paid to the member colleges as CST
tuition credits.
c. Investment Restrictions
In order to avoid speculative investing, federal legislation could
restrict the types of investments that a CST could purchase and
still retain tax-exempt status. For example, legislation could limit
CST investments to the purchase of only highly rated debt securi-
ties and common stocks with proven earnings per share records. In
addition, there.could be limits on the amount of the total CST
portfolio that could be invested in one type of security (e.g., corpo-
rate bonds) or the securities of one issuer (e.g., X Company annui-
ties). These types of broad guidelines should help give colleges the
confidence that the investment they are counting on to meet future
tuition costs will not be squandered.8
d. Refund Options
If a child falls to attend a CST member college, the CST could
make a variety of refund options available. If the child attended a
non-CST college that was still a qualified educational institution,
payment to this college should not be taxable. However, the CST
could impose a surcharge, perhaps ten percent, to compensate its
members for bearing the investment risk for the participant. If a
child dies or decides not to attend college, the child's CST fund
balance would be payable to the parent. The parent would pay tax
on the investment earnings and a ten percent penalty on the earn-
ings as well. This penalty would help compensate the federal gov-
ernment for the time value of money lost on the tax deferral of
CST earnings attributable to the early withdrawal.
183. Alternatively, a cost sharing arrangement could be'established in which any excess
earnings are divided between all CST member colleges or reinvested to cover future invest-
ment shortfalls.
184. Colleges are no strangers to the management of large financial portfolios. Many col-
leges have substantial endowments that are professionally managed and provide a substan-
tial source of operating revenue.
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e. Benefits to All Parties
Under the proposed CST arrangement, middle and lower income
families, colleges, investment managers and the federal govern-
ment would all benefit.185 The economic catalyst provided by thee
federal tax exemption of plan earnings to a prepaid tuition plan
that is not an integral part of a state government would immedi-
ately attract substantial investment capital from the private sector.
This capital would, in turn, attract investment managers who
would probably compete for the opportunity to manage the CST
funds. Middle and lower income families would benefit by having'
an incentive to start saving for tuition expenses early,18 6 obtaining
a higher after-tax return on their investments and securing a guar-
antee against future tuition inflation. Colleges would benefit by
making themselves available to more tuition paying students and
sharing in the higher after-tax investment yield. Investment man-
agers would benefit by earning a fee for applying their expertise to
substantial portfolios. Finally, the federal government would bene-
fit by having to pay less student aid to CST participants. s7
A simple example can illustrate how the tax benefits of the pro-
posed CST vehicle would provide incentives to colleges, parents,
and investment managers to create, fund and operate a CST. Our
CST is funded with contributions of one million dollars for its first
class year. The CST invests the entire portfolio in government
backed securities (e.g., GNMAs and FNMAs) that have a weighted
average yield of ten percent. The parents that purchase CST cred-
185. The CST plan outlined above is merely an offering and does not purport to contain
the best of all possible features. Varying the service charges, withdrawal penalties, and
phase-out ranges could affect investor behavior and serve as a control on the allowance of
benefits to high income taxpayers. Moreover, legislators may find other more appropriate
investment guidelines and reporting requirements in any CST legislation. Finally, provision
of insurance to assure the stability of the fund, increased government oversight, and limits
on the types of colleges that could be members, are all issues that deserve further considera-
tion. We merely present the idea and do not claim to have the investment expertise neces-
sary to provide a detailed model.
The key, however, is providing an incentive and a methodology for middle and lower in-
come families to save for college tuition costs. For instance, instead of only exempting the
interest on the relatively low yielding Series EE Savings Bonds, why not shift the § 135
exemptions to trusts that invest in government backed mortgages that generally earn a
higher rate of return. The proceeds are still invested in federal securities, the interest is still
exempt and the parents and colleges have an opportunity to earn more.
186. See supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
187. See HAUPTMAN & ANDERSON, supra note 112, at 41 ("On a long-term basis the federal
cost for interest subsidies and guarantees against defaults range from 30 to 50 cents per
dollar lent depending on the interest rate.").
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its have a marginal federal tax rate of twenty-eight percent and
state tax rate of five percent. 18 8 Assume a weighted average tuition
inflation for all member colleges equal to nine and seven-tenths
percent. 8 ' The tax savings on CST investments when compared to
taxable investments would total thirty-three percent of the ten
percent pre-tax yield, or three-and-three-tenths percent. This
three-and-three-tenths percent could be shared as follows: three
percent to parents and three- tenths percent to investment manag-
ers. 190 Colleges would obtain part of the parents' portion of the
savings if the total investment yield outpaced tuition inflation.
Thus, parents could obtain a tuition guarantee and earn an after-
tax return of nine and seven-tenths percent rather than six-and-
seven-tenths percent. Investment managers could earn a three-
tenths percent fee on CST assets. Thus, parents would have a yield
incentive to invest their private capital in a CST, the investment
managers would have a fee incentive to manage the CST, and col-
leges would have a marketability incentive to participate in the
CST. Thus, market forces would provide the funding vehicle if the
heavy hand of taxation removed its presence from the prepaid tui-
tion area.
IV. CONCLUSION
The criticisms made of current prepaid tuition plans are serious.
However, policy makers should not abandon the idea. It is possible
to ameliorate many of the problems through restructuring the
plans. Moreover, Congress can and ought to remedy the tax
problems of prepaid tuition plans by enacting legislation that
would grant tax favored status to prepaid tuition plans and en-
courage the private sector to participate. Widespread marketing of
prepaid tuition plans, along with their availability on an install-
ment payment basis, would promote a shift in college finance from
borrowing to saving. The concept and implementation of these
plans may never become perfect, but having them available better
188. We assume the states would pass parallel tax legislation that exempts from tax CST
earnings and students who received such earnings in the form of tuition credits.
189. This approximates the 10% investment yield less the 3% management fee (3% man-
agement fee as a percent of earnings multiplied by a 10% yield = .3% fee as a percent of
principal and 10% yield less .3% fee = 9.7%).
190. A .3% fee on average net assets is similar to some fees charged in the private market
place. See, e.g., THE SOLOMON BROTHERS FuND, INC., SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT 8-9 (June 30,
1991) (where a stepped percentage fee system was used). This example uses only one fee
percentage for the purposes of simplicity.
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serves the public interest than not having them at all. In summary,
when it comes to prepaid tuition plans, "It's not love, but it's not
bad."
